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HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT:  
A MORE COMPELLING CASE FOR DIVERSITY 
 
Jonathan P. Feingold* 
 
Abstract 
For four decades, the diversity rationale has offered a lifeline to 
affirmative action in higher education. Yet even after forty years, this 
critical feature of equal protection doctrine remains constitutionally 
insecure and politically fraught. Legal challenges persist, the Justice 
Department has launched a new assault on affirmative action, and a 
rightward shift on the Supreme Court could usher in an era of increased 
hostility toward the concept of diversity itself. The future of race-conscious 
admissions may hang in the balance. 
In this Article, I contend that the diversity rationale’s present fragility 
rests, in part, on its defenders’ failure to center diversity’s most 
compelling quality: its ability to promote personal equality within the 
university. To fill this void, this Article advances the first comprehensive 
case for diversity rooted in each student’s interest in an equal opportunity 
to enjoy, regardless of race, the full benefits of university membership. 
This framing is appealing, in part, because it makes salient the present 
and personal equality harms that students of color suffer when severely 
under-represented in predominately white institutions. Race-conscious 
admissions, in turn, emerge as an essential component of institutional 
efforts to further normative commitments—ranging from racial 
integration to individual meritocracy—that should resonate with Justices 
across the ideological spectrum. 
To support this new framing, I resurrect the Supreme Court’s pre-
Brown desegregation cases. These decisions reinforce the constitutional 
infirmity of institutional conditions that compromise a student’s ability, 
because of her race, to access the full benefits of university membership. I 
then bridge the theory to social science that reveals how environmental 
cues—including racial demographics—can exact concrete and 
quantifiable burdens on students from negatively stereotyped groups. 
Although well-traveled in other domains, this research has only begun to 
inform legal scholarship.   
                                                     
* © 2019 Jonathan P. Feingold. Research Fellow, BruinX, Special Assistant to the Vice 
Chancellor, UCLA Equity, Diversity and Inclusion. Jonathan Feingold holds a B.A. from 
Vassar College and a J.D. from UCLA School of Law. Many thanks for insightful comments, 
inspiration, and feedback from E. Tendayi Achiume, Matthew Benson, Devon Carbado, 
Ingrid Eagly, Anna Faircloth Feingold, Cheryl I. Harris, Angela Harris, Stacy Hawkins, Jerry 
Kang, Jerry Lopez, Jason Oh, K-Sue Park, Richard Re, Angela Riley, David Simson, and 
Adam Winkler. I would also like to thank the editors of the Utah Law Review for their 
thoughtful feedback throughout the editing process.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
[T]he Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some relationship 
between . . . numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those 
[black] students admitted.  
– Harvard College Admissions Program (1977)1 
 
I had been trying hard to fit in with the rest of my classmates and to get 
them to see me as more than just “the Black man in the class.” 
– Marky Keaton, UCLA School of Law (2003)2 
 
[W]orries about belonging and potential are pernicious precisely because 
they arise from awareness of real social disadvantage before and during 
college, including . . . awareness of . . . numeric underrepresentation.  
– David S. Yeager et al., Psychologist, UT–Austin (2016)3 
 
For four decades, amid a largely successful assault on affirmative action, the 
“diversity rationale” has offered a lifeline to race-conscious admissions in higher 
education.4 For those interested in forty more years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 
decision in Fisher II5 came as a welcome surprise.6 Following eight years of 
                                                     
1 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (Powell, J.) (quoting the 
Harvard College Admissions Program).  
2 Brief of UCLA School of Law Students of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 554405, at 
*8 (quoting Marky Keaton’s testimony regarding his experience at UCLA School of Law 
following the passage of Proposition 209, which effectively ended affirmative action in 
California) [hereinafter UCLA Law Students Brief]. 
3 David S. Yeager et al., Teaching a Lay Theory Before College Narrows Achievement 
Gaps at Scale, 113 (24) PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. E3341, E3347 (2016) (describing 
the psychological harms that underrepresented students of color often confront in college 
settings). 
4 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013). A university could 
theoretically justify race-conscious admissions as necessary to remedy specific instances of 
discrimination attributable to the university. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09; see also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989). As a practical matter, this argument 
is rarely available.   
5 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
6 See Mario L. Barnes et al., Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-
Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REV. 271, 283–
84 (2015) (“Based on the Court’s opinion in [Fisher I] . . . we may not have to wait until 
2028 for a new determination on the efficacy of affirmative action.”); see also William C. 
Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational 
Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 
1055, 1120 (2001) (“[T]he diversity rationale for affirmative action may soon be rejected or 
curtailed by the Supreme Court.”). 
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litigation,7 the Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas’s race-conscious 
admissions program. In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the diversity 
rationale’s status as settled constitutional doctrine.8 Within months of the decision, 
Justice Ginsburg went so far as to predict that the Supreme Court had heard its last 
case on affirmative action in education.9  
This pronouncement already appears pre-mature. Litigants continue to attack 
the diversity rationale’s constitutional mooring in cases that appear destined for the 
Supreme Court;10 the Justice Department has opened a renewed assault on race-
                                                     
7 Plaintiff Abigail Fisher filed suit on April 7, 2008. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at 
Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), 
vacated and remanded, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), and aff’d, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). 
8 See Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39 
(2016) (“[Fisher II] . . . reinforces the legitimacy of the diversity rationale for affirmative 
action in higher education and, therefore, underscores a principle of racial inclusion that has 
otherwise been absent from the Court’s equal protection doctrine.”). 
9 See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Has a Few Words About Trump, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 
2016, at A1 (quoting Justice Ginsburg as stating: “I don’t expect that we’re going to see 
another affirmative action case . . . at least in education.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
10 See STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, ANNUAL REPORT OF STUDENTS FOR FAIR 
ADMISSIONS (Aug. 16, 2016), http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-08-16-2016-Year-End-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U 
JT-YMGL] (highlighting the cases brought against Harvard and the University of North 
Carolina). Both suits contest the premise that student body diversity constitutes a compelling 
state interest. See Complaint at ¶ 216, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. UNC, 319 F.R.D. 
490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 2:14-cv-954), http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.net 
dna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SFFA-v.-UNC-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/TLK2-5ZDD]; Complaint at ¶ 494, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176-ADB), 
http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ 
SFFA-v.-Harvard-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/22BR-7YFK]. In the Harvard litigation, 
following a three-week trial that culminated on November 2, 2018, the parties made final 
arguments before the district court on February 13, 2019. See Delano R. Franklin & Samuel 
W. Zwickel, Harvard Admissions Trial Will Stretch into 2019 with New Hearing, Filings, 
The Harvard Crimson (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/ 
11/15/admissions-trial-new-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/EDD5-A8QY]. 
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conscious admissions;11 and, with the recent appointment of Justice Kavanaugh,12 
the Supreme Court now holds five Justices receptive to arguments critical of the 
diversity rationale and affirmative action more broadly.13 Should pending litigation 
reach the Supreme Court, this reconfigured bench raises legitimate questions about 
the diversity rationale’s survival—and by extension, the future of affirmative action 
in higher education. 
Current threats are compounded by the doctrinal insecurity that has followed 
the diversity rationale since its inception in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.14 
Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, embraced student body 
                                                     
11 On July 3, 2018, then-U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the decision 
to rescind a 2011 guidance document concerning the “Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve 
Diversity in Postsecondary Education.” See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions Rescinds 24 Guidance Documents (Jul. 3, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-rescinds-24-guidance-
documents [https://perma.cc/556W-XDGF]. This follows news that the DOJ is investigating 
Harvard University’s race-conscious admissions program. See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. 
to Take on Affirmative Action in College Admissions, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2hm3vmf [https://perma.cc/Y7AU-X3WD] (“The Trump administration is 
preparing to redirect resources of the Justice Department’s civil rights division toward 
investigating and suing universities over affirmative action admissions policies deemed to 
discriminate against white applicants.”); Susan Svrluga & Nick Anderson, Justice 
Department Investigating Harvard’s Affirmative Action Policies, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/11/21/justice-
department-investigating-harvards-affirmative-action-policies/?utm_term=.6400f4b5a606 
[https://perma.cc/7PDB-VNGP].   
12 Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed to the Supreme Court on October 6, 2018 and 
takes the seat formerly held by Justice Kennedy. See Clare Foran & Stephen Collinson, Brett 
Kavanaugh sworn in as Supreme Court justice, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.html. 
Justice Kavanaugh has repeatedly expressed skepticism about the legality of affirmative 
action. See Kadia Tubman, Kavanaugh’s Views on Affirmative Action Draw Scrutiny, 
YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/kavanaughs-views-
affirmative-action-draw-scrutiny-113120833.html [https://perma.cc/B3LL-ZBS3].  
13 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“Three of the 
dissenters . . . examined the Law School’s interest in student body diversity on the merits 
and concluded it was not compelling.”); see also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2220 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“UT says that the program furthers its interest in the educational benefits of 
diversity, but it has failed to define that interest with any clarity . . . .”); id. at 2223 (“These 
are laudable goals, but they are not concrete or precise, and they offer no limiting principle 
for the use of racial preferences.”); Rachel D. Godsil, Why Race Matters in Physics Class, 
64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 40, 42 (2016) (discussing Chief Justice Robert’s hostile questioning 
in Fisher I).  
14 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978). This fragility is reflected in recent commentary critical of 
the diversity rationale. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Opinion, Drop the Euphemisms Around 
Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/drop-the-euphemisms-around-affirmative-action/2018/07/11/511bb61e-8482-11e8-9e80-
403a221946a7_story.html?utm_term=.ebd9d8c67568 [https://perma.cc/5D3S-4WJM]. 
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diversity as a vehicle to promote the university’s First Amendment interests.15 This 
First Amendment framing, even if a “master compromise”16 that has offered a vital 
constitutional hook for race-conscious admissions, undersold the case for diversity 
in ways that continue to impoverish the concept’s constitutional foundation and 
political appeal.17  
Specifically, Justice Powell elided what may be diversity’s most compelling 
quality: its ability to promote personal equality within the university.18 More 
precisely, Justice Powell’s First Amendment focus obscured how racial diversity can 
buffer students of color against the “present and personal”19 equality harms that 
                                                     
15 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (“[Student body 
diversity] clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. 
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been 
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”).  
16 Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1011, 1098 (2016) (“Justice Powell offered the nation a master compromise in the 
concept of ‘diversity’ itself—a framework that would allow limited voluntary race-conscious 
efforts at desegregation to continue, in a social form that would preserve the Constitution as 
a domain of neutral principles.” (quoting Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination 
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1470, 1539 (2004))); see also Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 918 
(1983) (“It was his vote, and even more, his singular (in both senses) opinion, that produced 
what has been called the ‘Solomonic’ result in Bakke.”). 
17 Critique and dissatisfaction, from the Left and Right, have followed the diversity 
rationale since Bakke. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1622, 1622 (2003) (“[T]he concept of diversity . . . is a serious distraction in the ongoing 
efforts to achieve racial justice . . . .”); Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of 
Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 930 (1996) (characterizing diversity 
as pretext for a project of backward-looking remediation); Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberative 
Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st 
Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 78 (2012); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 770–71 (1997) 
(“[Grounding the diversity rationale in the First Amendment] constitutionalizes the power of 
a privileged educational establishment to determine what learning shall be valued and who 
shall be taught.”); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity 
Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 416 n.170, 442 
(1998) (“Because academic freedom is a neutral principle favoring no particular substantive 
end, I do not believe it provides an adequate constitutional basis for the diversity rationale.”); 
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher 
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 323–24 (2006) (“Diversity sometimes operates as 
a goal in search of a justification. Its legitimacy and staying power depend upon more [of] a 
robust articulation of its underlying value.”); see generally Mario L. Barnes, “The More 
Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race” 
World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043 (2016) (reviewing critiques from the Left). 
18 See infra Part I.A. 
19 McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (“We 
conclude that the conditions under which this appellant is required to receive his education 
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derive from severe underrepresentation in predominately white institutions.20 This 
elision matters, in part, because it renders invisible a core diversity function that 
furthers values—ranging from racial integration to individual meritocracy—that 
should appeal to Justices across the ideological spectrum.21 Accordingly, when 
uplifted, this equality framework has the potential to buttress the doctrinal and 
normative purchase of affirmative action itself. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I offers a re-reading of the Supreme 
Court’s seminal diversity rationale cases. Although often overlooked, as early as 
Bakke, the Supreme Court linked racial diversity to the substantive experience of 
students of color. Attention to diversity’s equality function has continued to grow in 
the years since.22 Yet even as scholars and jurists excavate the relationship between 
diversity and personal equality, common accounts of diversity continue to under-
describe and doctrinally marginalize the core equality interests at stake—a result 
that hinders efforts to ease lingering anxieties about the diversity rationale itself.23   
To fill this analytical void and deepen common portrayals of diversity, Part II 
introduces the concept of “equal university membership.”24 This concept embodies 
                                                     
deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis 
added)). 
20 Claims of underrepresentation presume—often implicitly—an appropriate numerical 
baseline. See Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability 
of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1996). 
The same applies to diversity, a term that presumes some level of variance within a given 
population. For a multitude of reasons, the precise level of racial variance necessary to 
achieve the full benefits of diversity will likely turn, in part, on each university’s local context 
and history. Nonetheless, across contexts, more variance (as measured by a student body’s 
racial demographics) will reduce the likelihood that students from negatively stereotyped 
racial groups suffer unique, identity-contingent harms that their peers never have to face. See 
generally Nilanjana Dasgupta, Ingroup Experts and Peers as Social Vaccines Who Inoculate 
the Self-Concept: The Stereotype Inoculation Model, 22 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 231, 237 (2011) 
(reviewing research on the negative effects of solo status and token representation) 
[hereinafter Ingroup Experts]. 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1140 
(2013). This is reflected, for instance, in the Supreme Court’s increased attention to concepts 
such as “critical mass” and “racial isolation.” See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
318 (2003). 
23 See generally supra note 13. 
24 In this Article, I introduce the concept of equal university membership to fortify the 
proposition that diversity constitutes a compelling interest that justifies race-conscious 
admissions. Although beyond the scope of this Article, one might query whether conditions 
that deprive a student of equal university membership would create a cognizable injury that 
supports an affirmative discrimination claim. Moreover, my focus on higher education is not 
meant to circumscribe equal membership concerns to the university context. Assuming such 
concerns travel to, for instance, the employment context, the diversity rationale’s viability as 
a defense for affirmative action may indeed transcend higher education. Cf. Russell G. Pearce 
et al., Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions 
Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2423 (2015).  
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the proposition that within any university, every student has an interest in enjoying, 
regardless of race,25 the full benefits of university membership.26 All students have 
an interest in equal university membership. All students are not, however, similarly 
situated vis-à-vis one another or the institution. For students of color, environmental 
factors—including the absence of racial diversity—can exact unique, identity-
contingent headwinds that have the potential to compromise learning, social and 
academic engagement, and performance. To concretize the theory, I offer a 
taxonomy of the principle benefits derivative of university membership. I then draw 
on student testimonials and empirical scholarship that underscore the same basic 
insight: numbers matter, in part, because severe underrepresentation can undermine 
a student’s ability to enjoy the full benefits of university membership.27  
Part III concludes by detailing the broader doctrinal and political appeal of a 
diversity rationale that centers the relationship between racial diversity and personal 
equality within the university. I first invoke the Supreme Court’s pre-Brown 
desegregation decisions to reinforce the constitutional infirmity of institutional 
conditions that compromise a student’s interest in equal university membership. I 
then explore how student body diversity, as a driver of personal equality, furthers 
multiple values that already anchor contemporary equal protection doctrine.  
 
I.  GESTURES TO EQUALITY 
 
A.  Regents of University of California v. Bakke: Eliding Equality 
 
The diversity rationale emerged in Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke,28 a 1978 case involving the UC Davis Medical School’s race-conscious 
                                                     
25 In this Article, to promote analytical manageability, I focus on the relationship 
between racial diversity, racial identity, and equal university membership. This is in part a 
function of the particular status race holds within the Supreme Court’s equality 
jurisprudence. That said, given the complexities inherent to identity, future scholarship that 
examines the relationship between diversity and equal university membership would benefit 
from a more intersectional and expansive lens. 
26 As I describe in greater detail below, “equal university membership” has roots in the 
concept of equal educational opportunity but limits the unit of analysis to a single educational 
institution. See infra Parts II & III.A. 
27 See infra Part II.B. This Article explores the related phenomena of social identity 
threat and stereotype threat. These literatures are distinct from the social science—much 
from the field of education—that Justice O’Connor highlighted in Grutter. See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 330 (“In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, 
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better 
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them 
as professionals.’” (citation omitted)). For an overview of the social science presented to 
justify diversity across Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, see Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. 
Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does Diversity-Benefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion?, 112 
NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1609 (2018). 
28 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Eboni S. Nelson has traced the diversity rationale’s origin to 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950), and 
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admissions program. Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, struck 
down the challenged program.29 Yet in so doing, he left open the door for race-
conscious admissions.30 Specifically, Justice Powell embraced student body 
diversity as a constitutionally compelling interest that, under certain circumstances, 
could justify such policies.31 
Scholars routinely highlight Justice Powell’s First Amendment mooring.32 This 
is understandable. Justice Powell expressly championed diversity as a mechanism to 
further the university’s First Amendment interests.33 Nonetheless, by focusing on 
Justice Powell’s esteem for diversity’s “discourse benefits,”34 common accounts 
often overlook a separate diversity story embedded within Powell’s opinion—one 
rooted in the relationship between racial diversity and the educational experience of 
students of color. Even as he lauded academic freedom and the “robust exchange of 
ideas,” Justice Powell did not—perhaps could not—wholly decouple diversity from 
a university’s obligation to ensure that all of its students, irrespective of race, receive 
an equal education.35 
To locate this deeper diversity story, one must look below the surface of Justice 
Powell’s opinion to the sources on which he relied.36 This begins with the Harvard 
                                                     
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950). See Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of 
Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 592–93 (2009). Whether one places the diversity 
rationale’s origin in Bakke or this earlier caselaw, Mclaurin and Sweatt offer a valuable 
anchor for contemporary debates about the constitutional appeal of racially diverse student 
bodies. See infra Part III.A. 
29 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306–11 (1978). 
30 Id. 
31 Justice Powell rejected three alternative rationales: (1) reducing the contemporary 
underrepresentation of students from historically marginalized groups within the Medical 
School; (2) countering the effects of societal discrimination; and (3) increasing the number 
of physicians likely to practice in underserved communities. Id. 
32 See, e.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 64, 71 n.26 (2016) (“[T]he diversity rationale in higher education 
admissions . . . is rooted in First Amendment freedoms.”). For scholarship critical of 
Powell’s First Amendment frame, see supra note 17. 
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12, 313 (“Thus, in arguing that its universities must be 
accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust 
exchange of ideas,’ petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First 
Amendment.”). 
34 Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305 (2004) (“What I have called ‘discourse’ benefits are the 
core ‘educational benefits’ of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly, grounded 
in ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment.’”). 
35 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Charles R. 
Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. at 765 
(“But I believe that this distinction is misconceived. The diversity rationale is inseparable 
from the purpose of remedying our society’s racism.”). 
36 Justice Powell drew upon Princeton and Harvard—institutional elites to which he 
held at least one personal connection (he received an LLM from Harvard in 1932)—as 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147950 
2019] HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 67 
 
College Admissions Plan (“Harvard Plan”),37 which Justice Powell celebrated as an 
“illuminating example” of a constitutional admissions policy.38 According to Justice 
Powell, the Harvard Plan took “race into account in achieving the educational 
diversity valued by the First Amendment . . . .”39 Justice Powell praised the Harvard 
Plan’s flexibility, which he juxtaposed against the policy at issue in Bakke.40 To 
reinforce this point, Powell quoted the following passage from the Harvard Plan: 
 
But that awareness [of the necessity of including more than a token 
number of black students] does not mean that the Committee sets a 
minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who 
are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of 
applicants who are not only ‘admissible’ academically but have other 
strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays 
some attention to distribution among many types and categories of 
students.41 
 
The bracketed text, which Justice Powell inserted to clarify the reference to 
“that awareness,” deserves particular attention. Taken out of context, the inserted 
language suggests that Harvard’s vision of diversity aligned with Justice Powell’s. 
The problem is, this reading—which flows naturally from Justice Powell’s 
opinion—obscures a key reason why Harvard embraced diversity. Like Powell, 
Harvard viewed racial tokenism as a threat to the marketplace of thought required 
of a great institution.42 But Harvard also appreciated a separate and distinct threat in 
                                                     
authoritative voices on the benefits of student body diversity. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 
n.48; TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 393 
(2001). 
37 After Bakke, legal scholars and university administrators viewed the Harvard Plan as 
a blueprint for a constitutionally compliant race-conscious admissions policy. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–38 (2003). 
38 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315–17, 321–24. 
39 Id. at 316.  
40 See id. at 289, 316. Justice Powell also lauded the Harvard Plan’s expansive view of 
diversity, which was captured by the view that “[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something 
to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer,” and “a black student can usually bring 
something that a white person cannot offer.” Id. at 316. Although rarely described as such, 
these statements reflect the value of intra-racial diversity and inter-racial diversity 
respectively. See Carbado, supra note 22; Boddie, supra note 32. 
41 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (brackets in original).  
42 Powell’s discussion of discourse benefits assumes that a well-functioning 
marketplace of ideas requires some degree of equality—at least as to the balance between 
majority and minority perspectives. Although undeveloped in his opinion, this insight 
reflects the inherent relationship between principles traditionally located within the First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, respectively. See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (describing the interpretive technique 
of “intratextualism”); Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure 
of the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 368 (2008) 
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racial tokenism. Specifically, Harvard expressed concern that severe 
underrepresentation would uniquely burden black students and, in so doing, 
undermine their ability to receive an education equal to their white Harvard 
classmates.43 
This point is lost in Bakke, however, because Justice Powell omitted from his 
opinion the relevant portion of the Harvard Plan.44 In the paragraph that immediately 
preceded the language he quoted, the Harvard Plan stated the following:  
 
Comparably, 10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their 
classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds 
and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might 
also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and 
thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. 
Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions 
is aware that there is some relationship between numbers and achieving 
the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between 
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students 
admitted.45 
 
As the foregoing reveals, Harvard’s vision of diversity transcended the First 
Amendment, academic freedom, and discourse benefits. Critically, Harvard 
observed that racial equality within the university was inseparable from, and in fact 
dependent on, racial diversity within the university.46 Notwithstanding its centrality 
within the Harvard Plan, this insight never penetrated Justice Powell’s opinion nor 
his defense of diversity. Bakke, in turn, introduced a doctrinal justification for race-
conscious admissions that under-sold the benefits of a racially diverse student body. 
Beyond the Harvard Plan, Justice Powell missed at least one other opportunity 
to uplift the relationship between racial diversity and equality.47 As if preempting an 
                                                     
(“Indeed, the First and Fourteenth Amendments should be read together to support positive, 
race-conscious remedial approaches to the eradication of caste (and resegregation).”); Robert 
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 
1520 (1997) (“In this way the value of equality is installed in the heart of a revised account 
of the First Amendment. The tension between equality and liberty dissolves ‘once we 
understand that equality need not be seen as an independent value, based solely on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that it has First Amendment dimensions.’” (quoting 
OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE 
POWER 87 (1996))). 
43 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321–24. 
44 Justice Powell did, however, include the complete text of the Harvard Plan as an 
appendix to his opinion. See id. at 321.  
45 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).  
46 See id. 
47 Although unrelated to his discussion of diversity, Justice Powell did recognize that, 
under certain conditions, race-conscious admissions may be necessary to promote a more 
equitable and meritocratic admissions process. See id. at 306 n.43 (“Racial classifications in 
admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose, one which petitioner does not articulate: 
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anticipated critique, Powell argued that diversity’s pedagogical benefits transcended 
the undergraduate context and extended to, for instance, the Medical School at issue 
in Bakke.48 To underscore this point, Powell invoked Sweatt v. Painter,49 a 1950 
Supreme Court decision that struck down a Texas law barring African Americans 
from the University of Texas Law School (“UT Law”). Powell quoted the following 
language from Sweatt:  
 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot 
be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which 
the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would 
choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of 
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.50   
 
As with the Harvard plan, when read out of context,51 this language naturally 
buttresses Justice Powell’s First Amendment rationale: racial diversity constitutes a 
prerequisite for a robust exchange of ideas. But when read in context, the First 
Amendment frame gives way to the core equality concerns that permeated Sweatt.  
Sweatt was not a First Amendment case; neither the question presented, the 
Supreme Court’s holding, nor the quoted language principally implicated the law 
                                                     
fair appraisal of each individual’s academic promise in the light of some cultural bias in 
grading or testing procedures. To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered 
only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it 
might be argued that there is no “preference” at all.”); see also Jonathan Feingold, Racing 
Towards Color-blindness: Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 266 (2011) (discussing the lack of attention to Justice 
Powell’s observation that, in certain contexts, race-conscious policies might be necessary to 
promote more equitable and meritocratic admissions) [hereinafter Feingold, Racing Towards 
Color-blindness]. 
48 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313–24.  
49 339 U.S. 629 (1950).  
50 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634). 
51 I refer to at least two levels of “context.” Narrowly, context refers to the Supreme 
Court’s full opinion in Sweatt. Broadly, context refers to the societal realities that informed 
the Court’s reasoning and holding. Justice Vinson, who authored Sweatt, recognized that 
context matters: 
 
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from 
excluding white students from the new law school. This contention overlooks 
realities. It is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in the majority, 
attending a school with rich traditions and prestige which only a history of 
consistently maintained excellence could command, would claim that the 
opportunities affor[d]ed him for legal education were unequal to those held open 
to petitioner. That such a claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no 
answer. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate 
imposition of inequalities. 
 
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634–35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
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school’s (or its students’) interest in discourse benefits.52 To the contrary, Sweatt 
addressed basic equal protection harms caused by de jure racial segregation—
specifically, the deprivation of equal educational opportunity.53 Indeed, the very 
language Justice Powell quoted arose within the Supreme Court’s detailed rebuke of 
Texas’s racially discriminatory law.54   
Even if masked by Justice Powell’s opinion, the Harvard Plan and Sweatt speak 
to each other in important respects. There are, of course, meaningful differences. In 
Sweatt, the threat to equality came from positive law that formally excluded African 
Americans from UT Law and deprived them of the myriad tangible and intangible 
benefits derivative a UT Law education. With Harvard, the threat to equality was 
not formal exclusion. Nonetheless, Harvard recognized that admission to the 
university was insufficient to guarantee equal educational opportunities therein. 
Absent racial diversity, those African Americans admitted would suffer race-
dependent headwinds that, as a practical matter, would undermine the quality of their 
education relative to their white peers. Thus, irrespective of the source of harm, the 
Harvard Plan and Sweatt cohere around the basic principle that all students, 
regardless of race, have an interest in enjoying the full benefits of university 
membership.  
 
B.  Grutter v. Bollinger: Approaching “Critical Mass” 
 
If Bakke birthed the diversity rationale, Grutter v. Bollinger secured its place 
within the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. Grutter involved a 
challenge to the University of Michigan Law School’s (“Law School”) admissions 
policy, which permitted admissions officials to consider applicant race.55 In a 5-4 
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Law School’s policy.56 Justice O’Connor, 
                                                     
52 This is not to say that First Amendment principles were absent from Sweatt. 
Nonetheless, invoking Sweatt to advance a siloed First Amendment case for diversity 
untethers the decision from the equal protection concerns that motivated the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning and conclusions. Also, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, Justice Powell 
missed an opportunity to link the equality harms that flow from a lack of diversity with the 
harms associated with de jure segregation.  
53 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631–36. Justice Vinson referenced “academic vacuum” not 
to invoke (the absence of) discourse benefits, but rather to evidence the Texas law’s 
deleterious effects on African Americans. Id. at 634. This harm included the lost opportunity 
to interact and build relationships with whites, who comprised 85 percent of the state 
population and “most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom 
[Sweatt] will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.” Id. Given 
Sweatt’s exclusion from “such a substantial and significant segment of society,” the Court 
could not conclude that the education available to Sweatt was “substantially equal to that 
which he would [have] receive[d] if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.” Id. 
54 See id. at 631–36; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. 
55 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). 
56 Id. at 343. 
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who authored the majority opinion, adopted Justice Powell’s conclusion that student 
body diversity serves a compelling state interest.57 
Scholars have debated the degree to which Justice O’Connor transcended 
Justice Powell’s First Amendment mooring.58 On the one hand, Justice O’Connor 
embraced a vision of diversity animated by broad democratic values59 and 
commitments to societal access, inclusion, and equality.60 Yet as I discuss below, 
                                                     
57 Id. at 329 (“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse 
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of 
the Law School’s proper institutional mission . . . .”). In dissent, Justice Kennedy also located 
the diversity rationale within “a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of 
acknowledging a university’s conception of its educational mission.” Id. at 387 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
58 See infra notes 60–61. 
59 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32 (“The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms that 
‘[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of American 
society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government 
objective.’ And, ‘[n]owhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the 
context of higher education.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 331 (“‘[E]ducation . . . is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.’ For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity 
through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals 
regardless of race or ethnicity.” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))); 
see also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our 
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 118 (2003). Justice O’Connor also applauded 
diversity’s ability to promote institutional legitimacy: 
 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it 
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society 
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions 
that provide this training. 
 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.  
60 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32, 333; id. at 338 (“By virtue of our Nation’s struggle 
with racial inequality, [underrepresented students of color] are both likely to have 
experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less likely to be 
admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.”); see also 
Carbado, supra note 22, at 1143 (identifying eight benefits of diversity captured by Justice 
O’Connor in Grutter); Liu, supra note 17, at 416–17 (“The diversity rationale also has a 
foundation in the Fourteenth Amendment—not in the remedial duties just discussed, but 
rather in principles of equal protection that express the central democratic values underlying 
our constitutional order.”); Rich, supra note 16, at 1027 (“[Grutter] defined that mission, 
however, somewhat more broadly by placing greater emphasis on the larger social role of 
public university education, both in the marketplace and in our democracy.”); Robert C. Post, 
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 59 (2003) (“Although Grutter casts itself as merely endorsing Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke, Grutter’s analysis of diversity actually differs quite dramatically from 
Powell’s.”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1366 (2011) (“In Bakke, 
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even as Justice O’Connor embraced a comparably broader vision of diversity and 
marked concerns about racial equality within the university, she ultimately proffered 
a diversity defense anchored to the discourse benefits Justice Powell had 
championed in Bakke. 
In fact, the strongest case for diversity as a driver of personal equality did not 
come from Justice O’Connor herself. Rather, it arose in the testimony of several Law 
School administrators who Justice O’Connor invoked to unpack the term “critical 
mass.”61 The administrators explained that “critical mass” referred to the general 
threshold of “underrepresented minority students” necessary to “realize the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body.”62 But as the quoted testimony 
reflects, the administrators included among these benefits an improved educational 
environment for students of color.63 The administrators testified, for instance, that a 
critical mass “encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the 
classroom and not feel isolated.”64 They further explained that a critical mass could 
mitigate the force of racial stereotypes and foster an environment in which students 
of color do not feel “like spokespersons for their race.”65  
In many respects, these observations track those embedded within the Harvard 
Plan—specifically, Harvard’s recognition that there is “some relationship between 
numbers and . . . providing a reasonable environment for those students [of color] 
admitted.”66 Justice O’Connor did, indeed, quote this very language in her defense 
of the Law School’s goal to attain a critical mass.67 Worth noting, however, is that 
Justice O’Connor grounded neither her defense of a critical mass nor her invocation 
of the Harvard Plan on Harvard’s observation that a lack of diversity can burden 
students of color and thereby compromise their education. To the contrary, Justice 
O’Connor praised the concept of “critical mass” because it, like the Harvard Plan, 
permitted a flexible admissions regime in which “each applicant is evaluated as an 
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or gender the defining 
feature of his or her application.”68 Thus, in ways not dissimilar to Justice Powell’s 
engagement with the Harvard Plan in Bakke, Justice O’Connor marked diversity’s 
                                                     
Justice Powell’s justification for diversity focused on the First Amendment and educational 
concerns; by contrast, Justice O’Connor’s restatement in Grutter focused on concerns of 
social cohesion more generally.”).  
61 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19. 
62 Id. at 318. 
63 Id. at 318–19. 
64 Id. at 318. 
65 Id. at 319, 333 (“[D]iminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of 
the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of 
minority students.”).  
66 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978). 
67 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“As the Harvard Plan described by Justice Powell 
recognized, there is of course some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits 
to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable 
environment for those students admitted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
68 Id. at 336–37; id. at 330 (“Rather, the Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined 
by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”). 
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equality function only to omit this insight from her express defense of diversity as a 
constitutionally compelling interest.  
Professor Stephen Rich recently made a similar observation.69 He noted that 
Justice O’Connor “acknowledge[d] Michigan Law School’s expressed purposes to 
use affirmative action to foster minority inclusion and to relieve its minority 
students’ experiences of racial isolation, but nowhere within [her] list of diversity’s 
educational benefits does either purpose appear.”70 This diagnosis is accurate, yet 
may actually understate the dissonance in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Even within 
that “list of diversity’s educational benefits” are items that Justice O’Connor could 
have framed within a vision of diversity attentive to the relationship between racial 
diversity and racial equality within the university.  
Specifically, Justice O’Connor lauded diversity for its potential to “promote[] 
cross-racial understanding, help[] to break down racial stereotypes, and enable[] 
students to better understand persons of different races.”71 These benefits could be 
understood to serve multiple ends. Consider, for instance, racial stereotypes and 
cross-racial understanding, two concepts that go hand-in-hand. To the extent racial 
stereotypes and a lack of cross-racial understanding inform classroom conversations 
and interpersonal interactions, the impact will not fall evenly on all students. All 
students may suffer if stereotypes and cross-racial misunderstanding undermine the 
opportunity to gain a more “enlighten[ed]” understanding of society and become 
prepared for “an increasingly diverse workforce and society.”72 But beyond stifling 
classroom conversations, racial stereotypes and cross-racial misunderstanding have 
the potential to uniquely burden students from negatively stereotyped groups—that 
is, students of color who may themselves become the targets of such stereotypes and 
misunderstandings.73 In turn, lifting stereotypes and promoting cross-racial 
understanding does more than promote lively discussion. It also fosters a more 
equitable learning environment by reducing identity-contingent headwinds that 
students of color may otherwise face in the classroom.   
                                                     
69 See Rich, supra note 16, at 1035–36. 
70 Id.  
71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). These 
benefits are notable, in part, because they are racially inflected. See Post, supra note 60, at 
70 (“The account of diversity embraced by Grutter does not conceive of race as simply one 
element in a potentially infinite universe of differences. It instead points to the particular and 
unique value of racial diversity.”). It is unclear if Justice O’Conner would agree that her 
“diversity rationale” privileged racial diversity. In the same opinion that she embraced race-
specific benefits, O’Connor applauded the Law School for looking beyond race to “the broad 
range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to student 
body diversity.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
72 Id. at 330. Cf. Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 
1778 (1996) (“Critics have portrayed diversity as a tool only to help whites understand 
blacks—or as an exploitative way of adding spice to a white mix. We disagree . . . If a 
diversity program does not, in practice, allow all students to learn from each other, then the 
program is not serving the state’s interest in diversity—and the school should not use the 
‘diversity’ slogan to show how the program passes constitutional muster.”). 
73 See infra Part II.B. 
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Justice O’Connor did not, however, praise the foregoing benefits for their 
ability to improve the classroom environment for students of color. This is revealed 
by her explanation that “[t]hese benefits are important and laudable” because they 
promote classroom discussion that is “livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting.”74 Thus, even when Justice O’Connor identified 
benefits that sound in equality, she situated them within a diversity defense that 
continued to privilege discourse benefits.75 Accordingly, Justice O’Connor missed 
an opportunity to advance the First Amendment frame Justice Powell had proffered 
in Bakke.76 And even if the constitutional inquiry were constrained to the diversity 
benefits that further the “Law School’s missions,”77 as Justice O’Connor suggested, 
it would be hard to explain why that mission requires an educational “atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation,”78 but not one in 
which all students, regardless of race, can enjoy the full benefits of that atmosphere.  
 
C.  Fisher I & Fisher II: Maintaining the Status Quo 
 
The Fisher litigation, which culminated in 2016 when the Supreme Court 
upheld the University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions policy, did little to 
disrupt the diversity rationale embodied by Grutter.79 Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the majority, reaffirmed Grutter’s principal holding that “a university may institute 
a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining the educational 
benefits that flow from student body diversity.”80 Still, two points are worth noting. 
First, there was no guarantee that Grutter would survive Fisher, a reality that raised 
concern across the country.81 To the surprise of many, Justice Kennedy—who had 
dissented in Grutter just a decade earlier—provided the decisive vote in Fisher.82  
                                                     
74 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
75 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 587 (2003).  
76 This also appears to be how other Justices viewed these benefits. See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (framing “cross-racial understanding” as a matter of “good 
citizenship”). 
77 Id. at 333 (majority opinion) (“To the contrary, diminishing the force of such 
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot 
accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”). 
78 Id. at 363. 
79 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016).  
80 Id.; see also Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (“[The Grutter Court] endorsed 
Justice Powell’s conclusion . . . that the attainment of a diversity student body is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”).  
81 See generally Barnes et al., supra note 6.  
82 See Elise C. Boddie, The Constitutionality of Racially Integrative Purpose, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 533 (2016) (“Justice Kennedy surprised many with his majority 
opinion in Fisher II upholding a race-conscious policy in college admissions.”). Unlike the 
other Grutter dissenters, Justice Kennedy did not reject the diversity rationale. In Grutter 
and elsewhere, Justice Kennedy championed diversity while rejecting a rigidly colorblind 
jurisprudence that would condemn any race-conscious policy. See id.; see also Parents 
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Second, certain limited gestures to equality present in Grutter carried through 
to Fisher II. Specifically, Justice Kennedy grounded his support for the University 
of Texas’s admissions policy, in part, on the observation “that minority students 
admitted under the [race-neutral admissions] regime experienced feelings of 
loneliness and isolation.”83 Nonetheless, mirroring Justice O’Connor, Justice 
Kennedy did not leverage this observation into a more holistic and comprehensive 
defense of diversity tied to the personal equality interests of actual University of 
Texas students. As such, the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence 
remains tethered to a diversity rationale that, at its core, obscures one of diversity’s 
most constitutionally compelling qualities. 
 
II.  EQUAL UNIVERSITY MEMBERSHIP 
 
Part I identified moments in which Supreme Court opinions have marked the 
relationship between racial diversity and personal equality within the university. Yet 
as the foregoing reveals, this relationship remains under-theorized and peripheral to 
the Supreme Court’s express defense of diversity as a compelling interest. As a 
result, the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence continues to understate 
the full value and function of a racially diverse student body.  
To fill the void, this Part takes up what the Supreme Court has yet to do: 
integrate into the diversity rationale’s core logic the basic observation that students 
of color encounter identity-contingent harms in educational environments that lack 
racial diversity. To accomplish this, I first explore the principal benefits that flow 
from university membership. I then draw on student testimony and social science to 
elucidate how racial disparities can compromise a student’s ability, because of her 
race, to enjoy these distinct but related benefits. This exercise illuminates how racial 
diversity furthers a university’s obligation to ensure that all students, regardless of 
race, can access and enjoy the full spectrum of university benefits.  
Understood in this sense, diversity is compelling precisely because it promotes 
each student’s present and personal interest in “equal university membership.” As 
used herein, this concept builds upon the constitutionally-inflected imperative that 
all students, irrespective of race, have equal educational opportunities.84 Concerns 
                                                     
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[Although] race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”).  
83 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212 (alterations added). This is not the only instance in which 
Justice Kennedy exhibited concern for racial isolation, or identified diversity as a mechanism 
to mitigate it. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body, by 
contrast, serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the 
lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Roberts’ “all-too-unyielding insistence 
that race cannot be a factor when,” for instance, school authorities are faced with the “status 
quo of racial isolation in schools.”). 
84 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“We come then to the question 
presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even 
though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children 
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about equal educational opportunity are often associated with situations in which a 
racial group is relegated to inferior educational institutions due to de jure or de facto 
segregation.85 This involves an inter-institutional analysis: is the educational 
opportunity at Institution A equal to that at Institution B? The concept of equal 
university membership trades on this same egalitarian impulse but narrows the unit 
of analysis to a single institution. The underlying inquiry, therefore, is intra-
institutional and asks whether all students within Institution A have equal access, 
regardless of race, to the full benefits that accrue from membership in Institution 
A.86 To concretize the stakes of un-equal university membership, I now outline the 
principal benefits of university membership. 
                                                     
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.”). Equal 
university membership builds on existing theory such as Susan Sturm’s concept of 
“institutional citizenship.” Sturm, supra note 17, at 303 (“[A]ll institutional citizens should 
be able to realize their potential and participate fully in the life of the institution.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Rich, supra note 16, at 1042 (“[Grutter] overlooks tokenism in which 
minority students are admitted to contribute to the educational environment provided by the 
university but not necessarily to receive an equal education or to benefit equally from the 
education that they do receive.”); Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial 
Unevenness of Law School, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 112 (2013) (describing 
the concept of “racial unevenness”). 
85 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781–82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), this Court held that segregation of 
children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority group children of equal 
educational opportunities and therefore denies them the equal protection of the laws under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C.§ 1702(a)(1) 
(2012) (“[T]he maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools 
solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.”). This is the formulation of 
equal educational opportunity that the Supreme Court rejected in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that education does not 
constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution). In recently-filed litigation, fourteen 
public-school students and parents in Rhode Island have made similar claims that, by 
providing such inferior education, the “state has failed to fulfill its duties under the U.S. 
Constitution.” See Alia Wong, The Student Suing for a Constitutional Right to Education, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/ 
lawsuit-constitutional-right-education/576901/ [https://perma.cc/3322-EECH]. 
86 The concept of equal university membership recognizes that admission and 
matriculation do not guarantee equal educational opportunity. In other words, a student’s 
admission into an elite institution does not, in itself, ensure that student will realize an 
education therein equal to her peers. Cf. Kenneth W. Mack, The Two Modes of Inclusion, 
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 290, 296 (2016) (“George McLaurin was asking to participate fully in 
the life of the university. But what exactly would that mean? Would making good on that 
claim require, as it would in the housing context, a fundamental alteration in the way that the 
institution operated?”); Rich, supra note 16, at 1081 (“[E]ven winners are not equal winners 
if they are not awarded equal opportunities.”); id. at 1087 (“[S]ocial status interacts with 
organizational practices to influence opportunities for individual growth and achievement 
during and after an initial moment of selection.”). 
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A.  The Benefits of University Membership 
 
The principal benefits of university membership fall into at least three general 
categories: learning benefits, networking benefits, and signaling benefits. 87 By 
unpacking these distinct yet related benefits, one can better appreciate the layered 
and intersecting consequences that flow from institutional conditions which subject 
certain students to identity-contingent burdens. 
 
1.  Learning Benefits 
 
Learning is arguably the principal benefit of university membership. It is 
therefore unsurprising that learning figures prominently in the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence. This is particularly true in cases that have implicated 
the right to equal educational opportunity, which itself is embedded with concerns 
about access to learning.  
This focus on learning can be seen, for instance, in the Supreme Court’s 
landmark desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education.88 To buttress the 
Court’s then-controversial conclusion, Chief Justice Warren described education—
that is, learning—as “the very foundation of good citizenship . . . [and] a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”89 
Even before Brown, similar concerns had motivated the Supreme Court’s growing 
condemnation of de jure segregation.90 Such concerns arose in the context of laws 
that formally excluded non-Whites from certain schools (as in Brown),91 but also in 
the context of institutions that imposed segregatory conditions within the 
university.92 Irrespective of the specific context, the Supreme Court rebuked 
                                                     
87 This list is no doubt non-exhaustive. Nonetheless, my intent is to offer a point of 
departure that explores the principal benefits of university membership and its relationship 
to student body diversity. 
88 347 U.S. at 493 (“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”). 
89 Id. 
90 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950) 
(“The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. 
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and 
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.”); Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“The law school, the proving ground for legal learning 
and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which 
the law interacts.”). 
91 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
92 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
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conditions that denied certain students, because of their race, learning opportunities 
equal to their peers.93  
Concerns about learning have also been featured in the Supreme Court’s 
embrace of diversity as a constitutionally compelling interest.94 This includes Bakke, 
when Justice Powell championed diversity and the educational benefits derivative 
thereof as critical to the university’s educational mission.95 In many ways, Justice 
Powell’s diversity rationale was predicated on the notion that diversity promotes, 
and may be necessary for, the learning required of a great institution.96 This 
sentiment, alive in Grutter and Fisher, is captured by the Supreme Court’s oft-
repeated homage to “the educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity.”97   
More concretely, one can understand learning as the knowledge, skills, and 
training that a student acquires during her university tenure. As the Supreme Court 
has noted, learning takes many forms and occurs in a variety of institutional settings, 
some formal, others informal; some academic, others social.98 Formal learning 
includes specific subject matter and is acquired, often, through formal instruction in 
classroom settings.99 Physics students, for instance, learn about matter and its motion 
and behavior through time and space. Economics students, on the other hand, learn 
about capital, markets, and fiscal policy. Beyond the classroom, learning 
                                                     
93 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A. 
94 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (“[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning 
outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, 
and better prepares them as professionals.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 
(2003) (emphasis added))). 
95 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978) (“The 
atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher 
education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court noted 
in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples.” (citation omitted)). 
96 See id. at 312 n.48 (“[Learning] occurs through interactions among students of both 
sexes; of different races, religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, 
from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and 
perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to 
stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about 
themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this 
aspect of the educational process, ‘People do not learn very much when they are surrounded 
only by the likes of themselves.’”). 
97 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (emphasis added).  
98 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–13 n.48 (“[A] great deal of learning occurs 
informally. . . . In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this 
informal ‘learning through diversity’ actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For 
many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with roommates, fellow sufferers in an 
organic chemistry class, student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball squad, or 
other participants in class affairs or student government can be subtle and yet powerful 
sources of improved understanding and personal growth.” (citation omitted)). 
99 See id. 
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opportunities arise across varied sites, from dorm rooms and cafeterias, to 
organizational meetings and extracurricular events.100 
Learning confers intrinsic and extrinsic benefits.101 Intrinsically, I refer 
principally to the innate value of acquiring new knowledge: one gains the ability to 
see the world in a new, more precise, complicated, troubled, and nuanced way. 
Extrinsically, the acquisition of new knowledge and skills better positions one to 
solve a problem, decipher a previously unanswered question, or access higher levels 
of academic or professional achievement. Beyond the individual, learning enables 
students to benefit future employers and, ultimately, contribute to society writ 
large.102 The Supreme Court has celebrated this dimension of learning in cases that 
range from Brown and Sweatt,103 to Bakke and Grutter.104 
This Article is not intended to diminish the normative or doctrinal appeal of 
institutional efforts—including admissions policies—that promote learning in the 
university. To the contrary, concerns about unequal learning opportunities are 
rightly featured in Brown, which arguably remains the Supreme Court’s most 
celebrated equal protection opinion. Yet in the context of affirmative action, the 
Supreme Court has yet to meaningfully link diversity to the goal of equal learning 
opportunities within the university. 
Whatever the educational opportunities available within a given university, 
equal membership concerns exist if, as a function of race, these opportunities do not 
flow evenly to all students. One can begin to see how such concerns might inform 
existing equal protection doctrine. Given a university’s compelling interest to 
promote educational benefits therein (via diversity),105 one could argue that the 
university has just as great, if not greater, an interest to ensure that all students, 
                                                     
100 See id. 
101 Although precise line drawing between what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic 
presents its own challenges, this dichotomy offers a useful heuristic for appreciating distinct 
learning benefits. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 1175, 1183 (2009) (“Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable simply in itself, 
regardless of its relation to anything else that might be valuable. To say that something has 
intrinsic value is to say that its value or goodness does not depend on external conditions and 
so is in that sense unconditionally good, or that we always have reason to want it to exist. In 
contrast, something is extrinsically valuable if its value depends on conditions external to it, 
such as the condition of being causally related to a particular consequence, or the condition 
of being regarded as valuable by a particular person.” (citations omitted)). 
102 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“We have repeatedly 
acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, 
describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our political and cultural heritage’ with a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.” (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
221 (1982)).  
103 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
634 (1950). 
104 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 
n.48 (1978).  
105 This describes the diversity rationale as it exists under prevailing doctrine. See 
generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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regardless of race, can access those benefits. Student body diversity, it turns out, 
promotes both ends.106 
 
2.  Networking Benefits 
 
A second benefit of university membership is “networking,” a term I employ 
to capture a student’s social engagements and relationship-building within the 
university.107 As with learning, concerns about networking surfaced within the 
Supreme Court’s pre-Brown de-segregation jurisprudence. One can understand the 
Court’s decision in Sweatt, for instance, as resting on the inequitable networking 
opportunities available to African American students excluded from the University 
of Texas Law School.108 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court specifically 
cited this deficiency to support its conclusion that the education offered to African 
Americans was unequal to that available to their white peers.109 
From the university student’s perspective, networking occurs along at least 
three primary planes: (1) student to student; (2) student to staff and faculty; 
(3) student to alumni. Across each plane, networking has the potential to confer 
short- and long-term benefits. In the short term, meaningful relationships can imbue 
students with a greater sense of social belonging, which itself can produce positive 
feedback loops and buffer students against negative recursive processes.110 An 
enhanced sense of social belonging, in turn, builds institutional trust and increases a 
                                                     
106 See infra Part II.B. 
107 See generally Per Davidsson & Benson Honig, The Role of Social and Human 
Capital Among Nascent Entrepreneurs, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 301, 307 (2003) (“[Social 
capital is] provided by extended family, community-based, or organizational relationships 
[and] are theorized to supplement the effects of education, experience and financial 
capital.”); see also Cindy A. Schipani et al., Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of 
Organizational Leadership: The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, 16 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 103 (2009). 
108 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 (“The law school to which Texas is willing to admit 
petitioner excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which number 85% 
of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and 
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member 
of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we 
cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he 
would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.”).  
109 Id. 
110 See infra Section II.B.2.a; see also Dorainne Green et al., Relationship Inequalities 
in Law School at 2 (working paper) (on file with author and Utah Law Review) (reviewing 
research that found “law students from stigmatized backgrounds (e.g., racial/ethnic 
minorities) report having weaker social relationships in law school . . . [which] predicted 
lower sense of belonging[,] . . . reduced satisfaction with their law school experience, and 
lower grades in law school”). 
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student’s broader social and academic engagement—all of which better position a 
student to reach her full potential, academic and otherwise, within the university and 
beyond.111 
Positive inter-personal relationships offer additional benefits. Relationships 
with institutional insiders—often in the form of formal or informal mentors—offer 
access to insider knowledge that can facilitate successful navigation of an 
institution’s social and academic domains.112 Mentors can also become a place of 
refuge, particularly for students who might otherwise feel out of place, unwelcome, 
or under-valued in the university. Often, quality mentor relationships prove critical 
to one’s present and future success.113 Relationships born within the university can 
bear future fruit in the form of more advanced academic and professional 
opportunities down the road.114 Whether in the form of a letter of reference or an 
unsolicited notice about a job opening, personal and organizational relationships 
often prove invaluable long after graduation.115 
In contexts that include yet transcend higher education, quality networking will 
be most valuable to students who, relative to their peers, lack preexisting 
relationships within the subject profession or industry.116 Given histories of 
exclusion and contemporary segregation in the United States,117 this unevenness will 
often have a racially disparate impact. Accordingly, when institutional conditions 
                                                     
111 See infra Section II.B.2.a. 
112 On the value of diverse mentoring networks, see Meera E. Deo & Kimberly A. 
Griffin, The Social Capital Benefits of Peer-Mentoring Relationships in Law School, 38 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 305, 313, 330 (2011); see also Leary Davis, Building Legal Talent: 
Mentors, Coaches, Preceptors and Gurus in the Legal Profession, 20 PROF. LAW. 12, 12 
(2011) (“These traditional mentoring relationships occur spontaneously and informally. 
They tend to be long-lasting, based on mutual respect, personal friendship and, more often 
than not, shared values. Mentors are attracted to protégés because of their personalities and 
their apparent skill.”). 
113 See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 540 (1996). 
114 See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. 
SOC. S95, S100–01 (1988). 
115 See Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in 
Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 83, 103–04 (2013) (“The findings showed ‘that female managers can miss out 
on global appointments because they lack mentors, role models, sponsorship, or access to 
appropriate networks—all of which are commonly available to their male counterparts.’” 
(citation omitted)); see also Bo Han, Mentoring Policies to Increase Women’s Participation 
in Commercial Science, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 437 (2009) (“Ties with the 
right people, in the right configuration, may increase an individual’s access to organizational 
influence and career mobility.”).  
116 Id. 
117 Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have any Non-White 
Friends, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends/?utm_term 
=.9e5463614829 [https://perma.cc/D5MX-VD2X]. 
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hinder the ability of students from historically underrepresented groups to take full 
advantage of institutional networks, the resulting harm could be two-fold. First, the 
student suffers personally; she is deprived a resource available to her classmates. 
Second, to the extent that initial deprivation excludes the student from the relevant 
market, the institution’s failure to provide equal access to networks will itself 
reinforce and perpetuate (if not exacerbate) historical inequities within the relevant 
industry or domain.  
 
3.  Signaling Benefits 
 
A third and distinct benefit derived from university membership is “signaling.” 
Most broadly, the term “signaling” can be understood as the meaning communicated 
by a given proxy.118 For purposes of this Article, I am most interested in the meaning 
communicated by a student’s academic record—that is, a student’s academic 
signaling. Academic signaling, which bears significant consequences, arguably 
begins with the institution a student attends.119 Prospective employers, for instance, 
often view an applicant’s alma mater as a proxy for valued professional 
characteristics.120 Students accordingly benefit from (or are disadvantaged by) their 
school’s relative reputation and prestige.   
Academic signaling does not, however, end with the university an individual 
attends. In most cases, academic signaling also turns on a student’s academic 
performance (e.g., grades, awards, or other academic accolades), activities (e.g., 
intercollegiate athletics or student organizations), and university service (e.g., 
                                                     
118 For a discussion on signaling in employment settings, see Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, The Economics of Race and Gender: Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 
103, 113 (2000).   
119 Educational entities, from pre-kindergarten through professional schools, represent 
stops on a track to greater opportunity, power, and privilege. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training 
ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy 
roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, 
and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives . . . . A 
handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States 
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court 
judges.” (citations omitted)). 
120 Consider, for example, two law students who both graduated with a 3.6 GPA, one 
from Harvard Law School, the other from a third-tier institution. If the employer knows 
nothing else about the applicants, it will likely conclude that the student from Harvard (a 
“prestigious” institution) is more likely to possess the characteristics need to be a successful 
lawyer. Cf. Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 95 (noting that prestigious federal appellate 
court clerkships, along with providing invaluable work experience, provide an additional 
benefit—access to more coveted prizes and positions—in a way that a less prestigious 
clerkship (or no clerkship) does not). This example is not meant to treat the use of  proxies 
as uncontestable, but rather to describe their common use.  
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student government).121 Each piece of a student’s academic record, and the record 
as a whole, tells a story about the student’s personal character and her academic and 
professional talent and potential.  
In most contexts, academic performance will carry greater weight than other 
portions of the academic record. A student’s academic performance, in turn, carries 
pronounced short and long-term consequences. In the short-term, academic under-
performance122 might inaccurately signal (to the student and others) that a student 
lacks what it takes to succeed in a given domain. This can erode a student’s 
confidence and sense of belonging, confirm doubts about one’s “fit,” and foster 
withdrawal or disengagement within the relevant discipline or domain.123 It may also 
lead university faculty or staff to encourage the student to explore a different area of 
study. 
Signaling, as a function of academic performance, also impacts future academic 
and professional opportunities inside the university and beyond.124 Grades are often 
viewed as powerful proxies about intellectual ability and potential. Within the 
university, entry-level classes can function as gateways to more advanced courses 
and subject matter. Even if a student is otherwise capable, academic under-
performance (and the signal it communicates) early in a student’s academic career 
can compromise the student’s ability to proceed vertically through a given discipline 
or area of study.125 Beyond the university, employers and graduate or professional 
programs commonly rely on GPA (among other metrics of academic achievement) 
to gauge academic and professional talent and potential. Succeed—relative to your 
peers—and increase your chances of advancing. Fail to do so, and your chances 
accordingly dwindle.   
Standard articulations of diversity and its educational benefits rarely account 
for signaling. This makes sense given that such articulations rarely account for the 
identify-contingent headwinds that students of color confront when severely 
underrepresented in predominately white institutions. Academic performance, good 
                                                     
121 Irrespective of the student’s success therein, a powerful signal comes from the 
institution itself. 
122 By under-performance, I mean that environmental factors undermined the student’s 
ability to perform up to her ability. Had those environmental factors been removed, the 
student’s performance would have improved and offered a more accurate reflection of her 
existing talent and potential. This notion of under-performance is consistent with, and 
reflects findings from, the stereotype threat literature. See Walton & Spencer, infra note 193, 
at 1137.  
123 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342. 
124 See Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 95 (“Beyond signaling talent or merit to 
future employers, first-semester and first-year grades indicate to students whether law school 
was the proper choice, the proper fit, and whether ‘I belong here.’”).  
125 How an institution or student interprets underperformance may trade on socially 
salient attitudes and stereotypes concerning that student’s “fit” in a given domain. See 
Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes Wide Open: What Social Science Can Tell 
Us About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1707–10 
(2018) (describing how an “Elite Student Paradigm” centers whiteness and imagines students 
of color—particularly Black students—as perpetual university outsiders).  
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or bad, is presumed to accurately reflect a student’s talent and potential.126 Little 
attention is paid to the way in which institutional environments—including racial 
demographics—may uniquely impact students from negatively stereotyped groups, 
and thereby result in grades that under-state a student’s existing ability.127   
The failure to link diversity with academic performance was hardly inevitable. 
From Bakke through Fisher II, Justices sewed their opinions with the insight of 
university administrators who themselves expressed concern about the race-based 
harms associated with racial tokenism.128 If one accepts such observations, it would 
be odd to conclude that such headwinds never impact academic performance (and, 
by extension, a student’s ability to signal their full talent and potential). To the 
contrary, in a setting characterized by unequal headwinds, academic performance 
will likely under-signal the actual talent and ability of underrepresented students. 
Their unburdened peers, in contrast, reap a relative and unearned signaling boost.129  
Ultimately, some may view signaling as an odd category to include within a 
taxonomy of university benefits. I do so for two reasons. First, as discussed above, 
signaling carries tremendous practical consequences. Even if academic performance 
cannot guarantee future success, many a door are unlikely to open unless one enters 
a prestigious institution and succeeds therein. Second, as I discuss in greater detail 
in Part III, signaling warrants attention because it taps into values that continue to 
inform the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. For over four decades, 
the Supreme Court has viewed with skepticism selection processes that compromise 
an individual’s ability to compete for public benefits on the basis of individual merit, 
regardless of one’s race.130 When institutional conditions exact race-dependent 
burdens on certain students, those students are deprived of such an opportunity. In 
other words, when one defends diversity as a mechanism to mitigate harms that 
contravene basic commitments to individual meritocracy, race-conscious 
admissions emerge as a tool to promote values that a majority of Supreme Court 
Justices—including those traditionally hostile to affirmative action—continue to 
locate at the core of equal protection.131 
  
                                                     
126 See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-
Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. Rev. 1075, 1109–13 (2009) (discussing the 
distinction between “minority deficiency” and “test deficiency” theories of 
underperformance). 
127 See infra Section II.B.2.b (discussing findings on stereotype threat). 
128 See supra Sections I.A–C. 
129 See Feingold, Racing Towards Color-blindness, supra note 47; infra Section 
II.B.2.b. 
130 See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that equal protection doctrine has been designed to further each 
individual’s “right to compete” on the basis of individual “merit,” regardless of a person’s 
race) [hereinafter Feingold, Equal Protection]. 
131 See supra Part III.C. 
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4.  Intersecting and Interacting Benefits 
 
This brief overview of learning, networking, and signaling benefits is not meant 
to be comprehensive of the varied benefits that flow from university membership. 
Nonetheless, by unpacking these components of university membership, this brief 
exposition helps to illuminate the discrete and reinforcing harms that may arise when 
institutional conditions subject certain students to identity-contingent harms. When 
a student faces racial isolation on campus, or confronts negative stereotypes in the 
classroom, the impact is not limited to the emotional or physical toll of the 
experience itself.132 There is also the threat that the harm compounds by interfering 
with the student’s ability to learn, to engage, and to perform.  
But it is not just that learning, networking, or signaling may suffer. These 
dimensions of university membership are inherently intertwined; conditions that 
impact one will likely compromise others as well.133 Consider a scenario in which 
institutional conditions undermine a student’s ability to learn. To the extent learning 
suffers, that hit will likely impact the student’s academic performance. The student’s 
academic performance, in turn, translates into a grade (or grades) that under-state(s) 
that student’s actual academic talent and potential. Thus, even though learning and 
signaling may be analytically distinct, when institutional conditions compromise 
one, it will often be difficult to quarantine that harm from the other. 
I am not suggesting, however, that there is always a direct relationship between 
learning, networking, and signaling. One could imagine a different scenario in which 
institutional conditions (e.g., pervasive racial stereotypes) cause a student to 
academically disengage (e.g., by electing not to speak in class or attend office 
hours).134 Due to this academic disengagement, the student’s learning (that derived 
from active participation in the classroom and office hours) would likely suffer. The 
student may nonetheless excel academically and receive a top grade in the class. 
Under this scenario, the hit to learning has not compromised the student’s academic 
performance; signaling attributable to that grade is, accordingly, unaffected. In fact, 
                                                     
132 See Mary C. Murphy et al., Cognitive Costs of Contemporary Prejudice, 16 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 560, 564–69 (2012) (discussing results of separate 
studies that suggest exposure to racial prejudice disrupts racial minorities’ cognition).  
133 See Greene et al., supra note 110, at 25 (describing the relationship between 
“stigmatized” law students’ relationships in law school, sense of belonging, law school 
satisfaction, and academic achievement). The Supreme Court appreciates the overlapping 
relationship between learning and networking. Across multiple contexts, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that learning arises, in part, from a student’s engagement with those from 
different backgrounds and experiences. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 312 n.48 (1978); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 
(1950). One could imagine this interdependency as follows (or in the negative): Networking 
promotes learning (social disengagement undermines learning); learning promotes signaling 
(failure to learn undermines academic performance which entails negative signaling); 
signaling promotes learning and networking (poor academic performance reinforces feelings 
of nonbelonging). Rinse and repeat. 
134 See UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at 19–28 (describing how 
underrepresentation can create environments that dissuade students from speaking in class). 
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the student’s academic performance may mask what have become silent harms that 
nonetheless bear independent learning or networking costs.135 And beyond the 
individual student, when environmental conditions chill the speech of under-
represented students (or otherwise minority perspectives), classroom discussion 
suffers—and so does the learning of other students in the class. 
To further concretize the relationship between diversity and equal university 
membership, I now bridge the theory to student testimony and social science. 
Collectively, the personal accounts and empirical scholarship reinforce the same 
basic insight: racial diversity matters, in part, because severe underrepresentation 
can exact race-contingent burdens that undermine a student’s ability to access the 
full benefits of university membership. 
 
B.  Linking Diversity and Personal Equality 
 
1.  The Student Perspective 
 
As Part I revealed, university administrators understand that students of color, 
absent a racially diversity student body, face unique burdens within the university. 
Administrators are not alone in this assessment. Students also appreciate the 
potentially deleterious impact of severe underrepresentation. However, unlike 
university administrators, students and their voices remain largely absent from the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of diversity and its educational benefits. As a result, the 
Supreme Court continues to overlook some of the individuals best positioned to 
describe the challenges that befall underrepresented students of color on 
predominately white campuses.  
This omission is not the result of silent students. To the contrary, students have 
long been on the frontlines to preserve affirmative action and to resist the re-
segregation of American institutions. One notable example comes from the UCLA 
School of Law Students of Color amicus brief submitted in Grutter.136 As the 
students attested, they were uniquely positioned to “comment on [Grutter] because 
                                                     
135 See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 232 (“[S]ometimes people lack confidence 
in their ability and withdraw from achievement domains even when their performance is as 
good as their peers. In other words, performance and self-efficacy don’t always go hand in 
hand.”). 
136 See UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2. This brief was submitted by a coalition 
of law students and alumni of the University of California school system, including 
testimonials of students from Boalt Hall, Hastings College of Law, UCLA School of Law, 
and UC Davis School of Law. Id. at *19–28. In the roughly 15 years since this brief was 
submitted, UCLA undergraduate and law students have continued to document the 
deleterious effects of underrepresentation in a post-affirmative action state. See also, e.g., 
Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 112–14; RecordtoCapture, 33, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5y3C5KBcCPI [https://perma.cc/6E59-4DG9]; 
Sy Stokes, The Black Bruins [Spoken Word], YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2013) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=16&v=BEO3H5BOlFk [https://perma.cc/ 
37RR-7CL6]. 
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they ha[d] been directly affected by the prohibition against affirmative action in the 
UC system.”137 Their amicus brief drew on more than ten declarations and was 
signed by hundreds of students across four University of California law schools.138 
Through their individual and collective testimony, the students detailed the burdens 
that law students of color confronted following the passage of Proposition 209, a 
statewide ballot initiative that effectively banned affirmative action in California.139   
Notwithstanding the students’ admission to elite UC law schools under a “post-
affirmative action” regime, the severe underrepresentation and quasi-segregation 
they experienced exacted concrete and racially-inflected harms. The following 
accounts are illustrative: 
 
The worst thing about not having other Latinos in my classes is that I am 
expected to be the voice for “my people.” Every time I manage to work up 
the courage to speak, whatever I say is taken to be the opinion of all 
Latinos in the United States. I know that I am alone and would not have 
any allies in my positions and statements. Therefore, I often just sit in class 
and swallow my thoughts. 
– Rosa Figueroa-Versage, UC Hastings, Class of 2003140 
 
I am one of 13 Black students, and am often the only Black student that my 
non-Black peers come into contact with on a daily basis . . . . While other 
students are free to say whatever they like, I am constantly forced to think 
through and then re-think my comments before speaking to eliminate 
anything that can be characterized as resulting from my Blackness. This 
is a hard burden to bear. The only people who can identify with my 
struggles are my fellow Black students. However, because of our small 
numbers and the toll that repeated “war stories” can place on them, I 
often have to shoulder the burden alone. 
–Tiffany Renee Thomas, Boalt Hall, Class of 2005141 
 
One day I was approached in the law school courtyard by a couple of 
UCLA campus police officers . . . . Apparently, since I’m one of the only 
Black males walking around this school, this was enough for the officer to 
say affirmatively that I was the male [another student] had identified . . . . 
Once the officers realized that I was a law student, they didn’t even bother 
to ask me any questions about the alleged theft. However, from my 
perspective, the damage was already done . . . . I had been trying hard to 
fit in with the rest of my classmates and to get them to see me as more than 
just “the Black man in the class.” I was so emotionally distraught that I 
                                                     
137 UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at *1.  
138 Id. at *19–28. 
139 Id. at *2. 
140 Id. at *21. 
141 Id. at *27–28. 
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was not even able to go to class that day. It will be a long time before I am 
ever comfortable in the law school environment again. 
– Marky Keaton, UCLA School of Law, Class of 2003142 
 
Because of the lack of students of color in the classroom . . . the decision 
to raise my hand and speak out is not one easily made. I choose to speak, 
but only because the obligation I feel to those who fought before me . . . 
outweighs my fear of being ridiculed by my peers . . . . I suffer through 
Property class virtually alone as I wait for the professor to mention, just 
once, where all this “property” that we have so many laws about comes 
from. When I bring up the fact that the law of adverse possession that 
focuses on “efficient” use of the land is based on a particular Anglo 
conception of efficiency, the same concept of efficiency that often served 
as the colonial justification for forced appropriation of Indian lands, I am 
faced with a moment of silence and then, moving on . . . . My contribution 
has been effectively devalued and I am silenced for the remainder of the 
day.  
The only support network I find is from the few students of color in the 
first-year class. We share battle stories from the classroom and console 
one another in our anger and pain at the silence that is imposed on us by 
virtue of the fact that our numbers are not significant enough to render 
our issues “important” in the classroom. 
– Angela Mooney-D’arcy, UCLA School of Law, Class of 2004143 
 
I do not present this testimony as dispositive proof that students of color suffer 
race-based harms when universities lack racial diversity. Nonetheless, the accounts 
offer valuable, personalized insight that should inform contemporary conversations 
about the relationship between diversity and equality. The foregoing anecdotes 
illuminate, for instance, the multifaceted toll that students of color experience when 
severely underrepresented in the classroom. Although each student’s experience was 
unique, the testimony exposes common themes of racial isolation, racial identity 
salience, stigma-consciousness, emotional fatigue, and perpetual outsider status.144 
The fact that this testimony comes from elite California law schools in a post-
affirmative action context renders the stories particularly relevant for ongoing 
                                                     
142 Id. at *24. 
143 Id. at *22. 
144 UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at *19–28; see also Feingold & Souza, 
supra note 84, at 88; Elizabeth Pinel et al., Getting There Is Only Half the Battle: Stigma 
Consciousness and Maintaining Diversity in Higher Education, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 481, 482 
(2005). Beyond adding texture to what can often be an abstract and face-less conversation 
about diversity, I include these statements to center and uplift the voices of actual students 
who, following the abolition of affirmative action, faced conditions that compromised an 
equal university membership. It is also worth noting where the students found refuge: in 
spaces with other students who understood the toll of severe racial underrepresentation. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147950 
2019] HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 89 
 
litigation that implicates the future of race-conscious admissions nationwide.145 
They also counter lay theories that identify race-conscious admissions as the source 
of racial stigma or presumptions of non-belonging that students of color face in elite 
institutions.146 
Ultimately, these anecdotes occupy one piece of a broader mosaic of evidence 
concerning the relationship between racial demographics and a university’s ability 
to realize an equal university membership for all students. Another piece of this 
story, to which I now turn, comes from two related bodies of scholarship which 
further fortify the case for diversity by empirically anchoring the theory and personal 
testimony to social science.  
 
2.  The Social Science 
 
Over the past decade, legal scholars have drawn heavily on implicit bias 
scholarship to disrupt assumptions about discrimination and human behavior 
embedded in legal doctrine.147 Aspects of the implicit bias research, particularly that 
concerning the debiasing potential of intergroup contact and counter-typical 
exemplars, are relevant to debates about diversity’s function as a driver of 
equality.148 At the same time, the implicit bias literature offers limited value with 
respect to the central empirical claim underlying this Article: that severe 
underrepresentation can exact identity-contingent harms that compromise a 
student’s ability to learn, engage, and perform.149 
Fortunately, distinct bodies of empirical scholarship speak directly to this 
claim. I refer specifically to research on the related psychological phenomena of 
social identity threat and stereotype threat.150 The social science reveals that 
irrespective of an institution’s egalitarian commitments, when environmental 
features—including racial demographics—signal that certain students will be 
                                                     
145 See supra note 10 (identifying existing lawsuits challenging the race-conscious 
admissions policies at Harvard and UNC-Chapel Hill). 
146 See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social 
Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1199 (2010) (describing a study 
that found that “[u]nderrepresented minority students in states that permit affirmative action 
encounter far less hostility and internal and external stigma than students in anti-affirmative 
action states”). 
147 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1495–97 
(2005). An August 27, 2018 Westlaw search for “implicit bias” identified 2,735 law review 
articles. Searches for “stereotype threat” and “social identity threat” identified 596 article 
and 52 articles, respectively. 
148 See, e.g., See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to 
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender 
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 649–54 (2004) (observing a decrease 
of implicit bias against women in a cohort of female students after one year in a single-sex 
university). 
149 See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (discussing the effects of stereotype threat and social 
identity threat). 
150 See id.  
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devalued or negatively stereotyped because of their race, those students encounter 
unique, race-based headwinds that can interfere with learning, decrease rates of 
academic and social engagement, and undermine academic performance.151 
 
(a)  Social Identity Threat 
 
Many students experience social belonging doubts when transitioning to new 
environments such as college.152 For students from negatively stereotyped groups, 
this general concern can be heightened by the particular anxiety that they will be 
devalued or negatively stereotyped because of their identity.153 That is, they 
experience what social psychologists have termed “social identity threat,” which 
captures the “broad threat that people experience when they believe they may be 
treated negatively or devalued in a setting simply because of a particular social 
identity they hold.”154  
Professor David Yeager and colleagues have explained that “worries about 
belonging and potential are pernicious precisely because they arise from awareness 
of real social disadvantage before and during college, including . . . awareness of 
                                                     
151 See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 232 (“Stereotype threat and social identity 
threat are known to undermine performance in domains where one’s group is negatively 
stereotyped and one’s belonging uncertain; over time, weak performance reduces self-
confidence in one’s ability (or self-efficacy) and leads individuals to withdraw from the 
domain.”). This literature does not stand for the proposition, nor am I arguing, that racial 
diversity can itself eliminate racial unevenness in the university. Still, racial diversity 
constitutes one piece of a broader constellation of factors that predict whether students of 
color will face race-dependent burdens within educational environments. See generally 
Deirdre Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness and Critical Mass in 
Affirmative Action, 73 PITT. L. REV. 339 (2011) (arguing that numerical representation might 
be insufficient to reduce racial stigma under a regime of rhetorical colorblindness); Sam 
Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative 
Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 
330–39 (2015) (reviewing interventions shown to reduce threat). It would be just as 
shortsighted to claim that individual bad actors are the lone threat to equality. Cf. Shelby v. 
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing a compilation of 
legislative records that documented “countless examples of flagrant racial discrimination 
since the last reauthorization; . . . systematic evidence that intentional racial discrimination 
in voting remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 
preclearance is still needed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
152 See Greg M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Brief Social-Belonging Intervention 
Improves Academic and Health Outcomes of Minority Students, 331 SCI. 1447, 1448 (2011) 
(explaining “[d]uring the transition to a new school, students can face frequent social 
setbacks and feelings of isolation.”).  
153 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3347 (noting social identity threat is not limited 
to individuals from negatively stereotyped racial groups, but has also been shown to impact 
women and first-generation college students, regardless of race).  
154 Mary C. Murphy et al., Signaling Threat, 18 PSCHOL. SCI. 879, 879 (2007).  
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negative stereotypes and numeric underrepresentation.”155 These identity-inflected 
worries can trigger doubts about whether “people like them fully belong,” whether 
they “will be seen as lacking intelligence,” and whether they “will be a poor cultural 
fit.”156 These particularized belonging concerns can “seed harmful inferences for 
even commonplace challenges . . . such as feelings of loneliness, academic struggles, 
or critical feedback.”157 As a result, students can perceive negative—but arguably 
minor—events as evidence that they do not belong more fundamentally.158 These 
inferences, in turn, can “sap motivation and undermine achievement through a cycle 
that gains strength through its repetition.”159 
A pernicious cycle results.160 A negative event confirms anxieties about non-
belonging, which can cause even highly motivated and talented students to 
disengage or withdraw from the relevant domain.161 Disengagement increases the 
likelihood of future academic underachievement, which reaffirms doubts about 
belonging and precipitates further withdrawal and disengagement.162  
Although pervasive, social identity threat is not an inevitable feature of 
university life. To the contrary, this psychological threat is environmentally 
contingent, meaning that its presence and severity turns on situational cues that 
signal whether an individual’s identity is stigmatized within a particular setting.163 
                                                     
155 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3347; see also Valeria Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social 
Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans 
in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 616 (2008) (“People who 
belong to stigmatized groups may question whether their group is valued in mainstream 
settings (e.g., workplaces, schools, religious settings), especially in ones in which their group 
has been historically discriminated against or stereotyped.”). 
156 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342 (noting students from nonstereotyped groups—
even if they experience general anxiety about entering college—do not confront these 
particularized anxieties moored to more fundamental identity-contingent doubts about 
belonging). 
157 Id. at E3342. Recall that loneliness and isolation were two concerns that Kennedy 
explicitly named in Fisher II. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (“In addition to this 
broad demographic data, the University put forward evidence that minority students admitted 
under the Hopwood regime experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation.”). 
158 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3348. 
159 Id. at E3342.  
160 Id. at E3342 fig.1. 
161 See generally Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 880–84 (supporting the proposition 
that “threatening features of a setting . . . may cause even highly confident, highly domain-
identified women to avoid or leave MSE fields”).  
162 See id. at 879 (noting many stereotype-threat researchers “have argued that targets’ 
reduced psychic resources . . . render them vulnerable to deficits in performance when they 
experience stereotype threat”). 
163 See id. at 879–80 (“[W]e contend that a person’s vulnerability to identity threat need 
not be inherent to him or her. Instead, situational cues may contribute to experiences of social 
identity threat among groups potentially stereotyped in a setting—even when targets are 
interested, confident, proven achievers in the relevant domain.”); see also Purdie-Vaughns 
et al., supra note 155, at 616 (“[G]roup members draw information from situational cues that 
hold relevance for the value and the status accorded to their group.”); Ingroup Experts, supra 
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Although at times overt, cues are often subtle. This can extend to an entity’s racial 
or gender demographics.164 When women or people of color, for example, are visibly 
under-represented within an institution, this environmental feature can itself signal 
that group membership negatively implicates an individual’s present and future 
opportunities and success.165 In contrast, when institutional conditions lift threat, 
students are freed from this identity-contingent burden and, like their non-
stereotyped peers, become positioned to experience positive feedback loops.166  
                                                     
note 20, at 232–33 (“Collectively, these examples suggest that the experience of being a 
numeric minority in high-stakes achievement environments where stereotypes are in the air 
may reduce individuals’ self-efficacy or confidence in their own ability, especially in the 
face of difficulty, even if their actual performance is objectively the same as majority-groups 
members.”). Institutional ideologies—such as organizational theories of intelligence or 
commitments to race-conscious or colorblind discourse—also function as situational cues. 
See, e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum et al., Racial Color Blindness: Emergence, Practice, and 
Implications, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 205, 206 (2012) (“[A] color-blind 
ideology not only has the potential to impair smooth interracial interactions but can also 
facilitate—and be used to justify—racial resentment.”). 
164 See generally Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 155, 615–18 (describing the ways 
in which low minority representation cues can lead to minority populations perceiving 
identity contingencies and distrusting the setting); see also Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-
Zeev, A Threatening Intellectual Environment, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 365, 370 (2000) (“The data 
from the current study support the conclusion that the presence of males constitutes a 
threatening intellectual environment for females performing a math task, and specifically 
that women experience a greater deficit in their math performance the more males there are 
in the environment.”); Michael Inzlicht & Catherine Good, How Environments Can Threaten 
Academic Performance, Self-Knowledge, and Sense of Belonging, in STIGMA AND GROUP 
INEQUALITY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Shana Levin & Colette van Laar 
eds. 2006) (noting different settings where racial and gender demographics cue a threatening 
environment). Contemporary social identity threat literature builds on prior research that 
observed the relationship between gender representation and threat. See Elizabeth Chambliss 
& Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter’s Legacy, 
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 43–48 (2000); Rosabeth M. Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions 
on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966–
67 (1977); Eve Spangler et al., Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter’s Hypothesis, 84 
AM. J. SOC. 160, 162 (1978). 
165 See Katherine T.U. Emerson & Mary C. Murphy, A Company I Can Trust? 
Organizational Lay Theories Moderate Stereotype Threat for Women, 41 (2) PERS. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 295, 296 (2015) (“[C]ompany settings may contain powerful cues that do 
not explicitly reference gender stereotypes and differences but nonetheless communicate 
messages about the value of groups, thereby creating different psychological experiences for 
stigmatized and nonstigmatized groups.”). 
166 Id. at 295 (“[W]hen cues signal that group membership will not impede peoples’ 
performance or mobility, stereotype threat is tempered.”); see generally Gregory Walton & 
Geoffrey Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit, and Achievement, 92 J. PERS. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 82, 94 (2007) (discussing intervention shown to decrease belonging 
uncertainty and increase academic performance in Black college students). 
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These alternative recursive processes are depicted in the following 
schematic:167 
 
 
 
Given the observed relationship between numerical representation and social 
identity threat, the vicious cycle depicted in the above schematic has the potential to 
exact a double harm on students of color.168 To the extent students of color 
experience social identity threat because an educational environment lacks racial 
diversity, some students from negatively stereotyped groups are likely to withdraw 
from those domains. For those students of color who remain in the relevant domain, 
they must contend with an increasingly homogenous environment that may present 
increasingly acute levels of threat. This double harm makes it even more incumbent 
upon the university to ensure that whatever societal realities it inherits, it does not 
institutionalize conditions that disproportionately burden already underrepresented 
students of color. There is also a flip side to this double harm. Students from non-
stereotyped groups, who never encounter racially-contingent psychological threats, 
accrue a corresponding and ever-increasing racial preference as their negatively 
stereotyped peers suffer.169 
 
                                                     
167 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342 fig.1 (“Theoretical model: the process through 
which lay theories affect disadvantaged students’ behavior and academic outcomes across 
the transition to college.”). 
168 See Charles R. Calleros, Patching Leaks in the Diversity Pipeline to Law School and 
the Bar, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2006); Michael A. Olivas, Law School Admissions 
After Grutter: Student Bodies, Pipeline Theory, and the River, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16, 17 
(2005). 
169 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342. 
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(b)  Stereotype Threat 
 
Stereotype threat, which has become one of the most widely studied phenomena 
in social psychology, comprises a particular manifestation of social identity threat.170 
Although relatively foreign to legal scholarship, stereotype threat research has 
drawn increased attention in the affirmative action context, both in the law reviews 
and in actual litigation.171 Most recently, the Fisher litigation saw amicus briefs from 
the nation’s leading experts on stereotype threat.172 The social scientists did not 
employ the terminology of “equal university membership,” but nonetheless 
harnessed the stereotype threat research to advance the same basic argument: 
personal equality harms can arise absent racial diversity.173 Specifically, the brief 
emphasized that severe underrepresentation in the classroom can subject students of 
color to concrete and quantifiable harms in the university.174  
These harms arise from stereotype threat, which refers to the anxiety that poor 
performance on a task could confirm a negative stereotype about a group to which a 
person belongs.175 This is not a phenomenon of general performance anxiety, but 
rather the more particularized threat of stereotype confirmation—a threat that has 
been documented across hundreds of laboratory and real-world studies.176 When 
present, stereotype threat can produce distraction and anxiety that “hijack[s] the 
cognitive systems required for optimal performance, resulting in low test 
performance.”177 As Professor Toni Schmader and colleagues explained in a 2008 
                                                     
170 See Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects 
on Performance, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 336 (2008).  
171 See, e.g., Erman & Walton, supra note 151; Feingold, Racing Towards Color-
blindness, supra note 47. 
172 See Brief for Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 23–24, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-
345) [hereinafter Experimental Psychologists Brief I]; Brief of Experimental Psychologists 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) [hereinafter Experimental Psychologists Brief II]. 
173 See Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at *27–29.  
174 See id. 
175 See Christine R. Logel et al., Unleashing Latent Ability: Implications of Stereotype 
Threat for College Admissions, 47 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 42 (2012). Early stereotype threat 
research was motivated by a desire to explain why racial and gender achievement gaps 
persisted even after controlling for wide-ranging factors expected to explain such disparities. 
See Ronald G. Fryer Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap 
in the First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 447 (2002) (“Even after controlling 
for a wide range of covariates including family structure, socioeconomic status, measures of 
school quality, and neighborhood characteristics, a substantial racial gap in test scores 
persists.”); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, 6 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 622 (1997); Claude 
M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 
68.  
176 See Logel et al., supra note 175, at 42.  
177 STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 6 (Michael Inzlicht & 
Toni Schmader eds., 2011).  
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review of the research, “stereotype threat degrades the ability to regulate attention 
during complex tasks where it is necessary to coordinate information processing 
online and inhibit thoughts, feelings, and behaviors counterproductive to one’s 
current goals.”178 Stereotype threat directly implicates academic environments, in 
part, because these are the precise areas of cognitive function essential for speeded 
tasks—such as university exams and standardized tests. 
Stereotype threat and racial diversity are linked, in part, because this 
psychological threat—as with social identity threat—is environmentally 
contingent.179 Although pervasive, stereotype threat is neither inevitable nor the 
result of personal or characterological deficiencies in individual students.180 To the 
contrary, stereotype threat occurs when environmental cues signal that certain 
people may be negatively stereotyped because of an identity they hold.181 This 
means that stereotype threat can affect “anyone who contends with a negative 
intellectual stereotype in a performance setting.”182 White men, for instance, have 
been shown to suffer from stereotype threat when performing athletic tasks and 
when compared to Asian students on difficult math exams.183  
Irrespective of the individual, several factors must exist for a student to 
encounter stereotype threat. First, the student must belong to a negatively 
stereotyped group.184 In most educational settings, black and brown students (and 
                                                     
178 Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 340.  
179 See Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 884 (“These data demonstrate that rather than 
being endemic to women, the experience of identity threat is attributable to the situation—
its cues and organization.”).  
180 See id. 
181 Emerson & Murphy, supra note 165, at 296 (“[W]hen cues signal that group 
membership will not impede peoples’ performance or mobility, stereotype threat is 
tempered.”). 
182 Logel et al., supra note 175; see generally Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, 
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERS. 
& SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995) (describing one of the seminal stereotype threat studies). 
183 See Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic 
Performance, 77 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1223 (1999); Joshua Aronson et al., When 
White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXP. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 33 (1999). 
184 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 798. This includes, for instance, women 
in quantitative fields, see, e.g., Linette M. McJunkin, Effects of Stereotype Threat on 
Undergraduate Women’s Math Performance: Participant Pool vs. Classroom Situations, 45 
EMPORIA ST. RES. STUD. 27, 30 (2009), African Americans, Latinas/os, and American 
Indians across academic domains, see, e.g., Joshua Aronson et al., Reducing the Effects of 
Stereotype Threat on African American College Students by Shaping Theories of 
Intelligence, 38 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 124 (2002); Patricia M. Gonzales et al., The 
Effects of Stereotype Threat and Double-Minority Status on the Test Performance of Latino 
Women, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 659, 666 (2002); Jamie Jaramillo et al., Ethnic 
Identity, Stereotype Threat, and Perceived Discrimination Among Native American 
Adolescents, J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 1 (2015), the elderly on memory-related tasks, see, 
e.g., Becca Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping, 71 J. 
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1092, 1100 (1996), and white men playing sports, see, e.g., Jeff 
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women in certain fields) will face socially salient negative stereotypes about 
intellectual inferiority. These students, in turn, are uniquely vulnerable to stereotype 
threat. This is a burden that their non-stereotyped colleagues never confront.  
Second, the negative stereotype must be perceived as relevant to the task at 
hand.185 Almost all academic tasks, including high stakes exams and standardized 
tests, are understood to measure intellectual ability. Accordingly, most tasks that 
students perform in the classroom context implicate stereotypes about the 
intellectual capabilities of black and brown students. 
Third, the performer’s relevant social identity must be salient during 
performance.186 This final factor links student body diversity and stereotype threat. 
As noted above, racial demographics function as a powerful cue that can heighten 
or mitigate the salience of racial identity and associated stereotypes.187 A student’s 
race is likely to be most salient when she is severely underrepresented in the 
classroom.188 Racial diversity, in turn, can decrease the salience of race and thereby 
buffer students against the negative consequences of stereotype threat.189  
                                                     
Stone, Battling Doubt by Avoiding Practice: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on Self-
Handicapping in White Athletes, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1667, 1676 (2002). 
185 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 808.  
186 See Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 879 (“Race, gender, socioeconomic status, and 
political and religious affiliations are examples of social identities that people carry with 
them. Yet the salience of people’s group memberships varies depending on the situational 
cues in a setting. In fact, previous research has shown that people often see themselves in 
terms of their social identity that is most stigmatized in the current setting.”); Margaret Shih 
et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80–82 (1999); Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 808. 
187 See supra notes 165–166; see also Denise Sekaquaptewa & Mischa Thompson, The 
Differential Effects of Solo Status on Members of High- and Low-Status Groups, 28 PERS. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 694, 695 (2002) (“Investigations in person perception have shown that 
those who are different from the rest of the group (and thus highly salient) attract more 
attention than nondistinctive group members. . . . [Solo status] disrupted the learning process: 
Solos had poorer recall of who said what during the group discussion than nonsolos.”); 
Emerson & Murphy, supra note 165, at 298 (describing numerical representation as a 
“particularly well-documented antecedent of stereotype threat”); Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra 
note 164, at 365 (“This last finding raises the possibility that as females are increasingly 
outnumbered by males, a situation that is common to many advanced-level quantitative high 
school classes, university courses, and workplace environments, females may become more 
aware of their gender.”). 
188 See Catherine Good et al., Improving Adolescents’ Standardized Test Performance: 
An Intervention to Reduce the Effects of Stereotype Threat, 24 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 
645, 647 (2003) (“[G]roup composition—the racial or gender mix in a room of test takers—
also can trigger stereotype-relevant thoughts, and thus vulnerability to stereotype threat 
because group composition can make salient one’s social identity and the stereotypes 
associated with that identity.”).  
189 See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 231 (“The demographic composition of 
achievement settings is often a critical situational cue that activates these stereotypes—who 
is visible and who is scarce?”). 
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The following hypothetical, included in the aforementioned Fisher amicus 
brief, illustrates how numerical representation can impact the salience of racial or 
gender identity:  
 
When A is the only black student taking Medieval Literature, he is likely 
to feel like, and to be perceived as, “the black kid” in the class. When B is 
the only woman majoring in Mechanical Engineering, she is likely to feel 
like, and to be perceived as, not just an Engineering major, but a woman 
majoring in Engineering. But when there are multiple members of one’s 
racial or gender group present, a person’s identity is less defined by group 
membership. Now A is just a student taking Medieval Literature and B is 
just someone studying Engineering. Stereotype threat diminishes in 
diverse environments, because group membership tends to become less 
defining of individual identity.190 
 
Stereotype threat tracks social identity threat in two additional respects that 
warrant note. First, stereotype threat is most likely to impact high-achieving 
individuals who strongly identify with the relevant domain “and for whom 
membership in the stereotyped group is central to their self-concept.”191 Second, 
stereotype threat is most likely to undermine performance on challenging tasks. The 
cognitive burdens associated with this threat begin to compromise performance 
when an individual is pushed to the edge of her ability.192 As a result, stereotype 
threat’s impact will predictably increase as students progress vertically through 
academic domains, passing through more specialized—and often more competitive 
and challenging—courses, programs, and institutions in which demographic 
disparities often become increasingly pronounced.193 
Two meta-analyses add additional context. The first meta-analysis examined 
group differences in both high and low threat environments from thirty-nine 
laboratory experiments involving nearly 3,200 participants.194 The analysis revealed 
that when stereotype threat is present, measures of academic performance 
underestimate the true ability and potential of negatively stereotyped students by an 
average of 0.18 standard deviations.195 A second meta-analysis included data from 
nearly 16,000 students across multiple randomized field experiments.196 Nearly 
identical to the first meta-analysis, this study concluded that standard measures of 
                                                     
190 Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at *28. 
191 Logel et al., supra note 175, at 44; see also Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 339 
(“Moreover, studies have shown that individuals experience stereotype threat to the degree 
that doing well in the domain is personally important to them.”). 
192 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 798. 
193 See Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra note 164, at 365; Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. 
Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores Systematically Underestimate the 
Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132, 1137 (2009). 
194 Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1134. 
195 Id. at 1135. 
196 Id. at 1137. 
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merit underestimate the true ability of members of stereotyped groups by 0.17 
standard deviations.197 Overall, the meta-analyses suggest that psychological threat 
accounts for nearly one fifth of a standard deviation in performance.198 Translated 
to the 2,400-point SAT range, this equates to roughly sixty-three points.199  
At face value, a difference of 0.17 or 0.18 standard deviations (or sixty-three 
points on a 2,400-point test) might appear trivial. But even if not intuitively 
substantial, this difference accounts for meaningful portions of observed 
achievement gaps.200 Moreover, it reveals the pervasiveness of stereotype threat and 
its real-world consequences.201 More importantly, these studies expose the degree to 
which standard measures of academic merit can systematically under-measure the 
intellectual ability and potential of students of color.202 Rather than reflecting actual 
disparities in talent, preparation, or motivation, a portion of these gaps reflect 
“pervasive [and identity-contingent] psychological threats in academic 
environments.”203 The research, in turn, suggests that a portion of perceived group-
based differences across educational settings is often illusory, a consequence of 
psychological harms that obscure the actual, but “latent,” ability of negatively 
stereotyped students.204 
A series of recent interventions highlight the real-word implications of 
stereotype threat and social identity threat.205 Anchored to decades of research, the 
                                                     
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at 18; COLL. BD., 2015 
COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 1 (2015), https://secure-
media.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/total-group-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3 
GW-JALV]. 
200 Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1137 (“The observed effect sizes suggest that 
the SAT Math test underestimates the math ability of women like those in the present sample 
by 19 to 21 points, and that the SAT Math and SAT Reading tests underestimate the 
intellectual ability of African and Hispanic Americans like those in the present sample by a 
total of 39 to 41 points for each group. Insofar as the overall gender gap on the SAT Math 
test is 34 points and as the overall Black-White and Hispanic-White gaps on the SAT 
(combining math and reading) are 199 and 148 points, respectively, these differences are 
substantial.” (citation omitted)). 
201 Id. Moreover, one could imagine students, or their parents, happy to pay high prices 
for a formula that guaranteed an additional 63 points on the SAT.  
202 Logel et al., supra note 175, at 42. 
203 See id. 
204 Id. (“This phenomenon, termed latent ability, suggests that stereotyped students’ 
prior performances underestimate the full extent of their academic ability—that their ability 
is in part hidden on these common assessments.”); see also Walton & Spencer, supra note 
193, at 1137; Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 336 (explaining how this research has 
established the “reliability and generalizability of stereotype threat on performance.” 
(citation omitted)). 
205 See generally Thomas Dee & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat in the Real World, 
in STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 266–67 (Michael Inzlicht 
and Toni Schmader, eds.) (2011); David S. Yeager & Gregory M. Walton, Social-Psychology 
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interventions were not intended to equip students with substantive knowledge or 
superior study skills. To the contrary, they were designed to buffer students against 
the psychological harms that accompany these identity-contingent psychological 
threats.206 The results are noteworthy. Across studies, negatively stereotyped 
students who received the psychological buffer consistently exhibited statistically 
significant short- and long-term gains relative to nonstereotyped students in all 
conditions, and other negatively stereotyped students in control conditions.207 One 
intervention, for instance, improved black college students’ grades over a three-year 
period, and in so doing halved the black-white achievement gap.208 A separate 
intervention reduced the black-white achievement gap of participants by about forty 
percent.209 These effects are not unique, but have been replicated across studies, 
including those involving women in science and Latino adolescents in middle 
school.210 
For universities committed to equal university membership, the social science 
should invite both concern and hope.211 On the one hand, evidence suggests that 
irrespective of an institution’s egalitarian aspirations, environmental conditions can 
saddle students of color with race-based harms that compromise basic commitments 
to equality.212 Moreover, the social science suggests that at predominately white 
institutions in which students of color remain severely underrepresented, it may be 
prudent to assume that stereotype threat is the default.213  
On the other hand, successful interventions reveal that institutions need not 
accept stereotype threat—and its deleterious impact—as an inevitable feature of life 
in higher education.214 This is not to say that individual institutions are positioned to 
                                                     
Interventions in Education: They’re Not Magic, 81 REV. EDUC. RES. 267, 269–73 (2011) 
(reviewing interventions and effects). 
206 Yeager & Walton, supra note 205, at 268 (targeting various social psychological 
constructs, including values affirmation, sense of belonging, and organizational theories of 
intelligence); see Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Recursive Processes in Self-Affirmation: 
Intervening to Close the Minority Achievement Gap, 324 SCI. 400, 400 (2009); Geoffrey L. 
Cohen et al., Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap: A Social-Psychological Intervention, 
313 SCI. 1307, 1307 (2006) [hereinafter Cohen et al., Social-Psychological Intervention]; 
Good et al., supra note 188, at 650–51. 
207 See supra note 201 (describing stereotype threat interventions). 
208 Walton & Cohen, supra note 152, at 1448. 
209 See Cohen et al., Social-Psychological Intervention, supra note 206, at 1308 (“The 
average treatment effect for African Americans was 0.30 points, roughly a 40% reduction in 
the racial achievement gap.”).  
210 See Akira Miyake et al., Reducing the Gender Achievement Gap in College Science: 
A Classroom Study, 330 SCI. 1234, 1235 (2010); David K. Sherman et al., Deflecting the 
Trajectory and Changing the Narrative: How Self-Affirmation Affects Academic 
Performance and Motivation Under Identity Threat, 97 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 591, 599 
(2013). 
211 See supra note 205 (reviewing successful interventions).  
212 See Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1137. 
213 Id. 
214 See supra note 205. 
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mitigate all forces that trigger threat. Recall the relevant elements: (a) a person must 
belong to a negatively stereotyped group215; (b) that stereotype must be perceived as 
relevant to a task the person is asked to perform216; and (c) the person’s relevant 
social identity must be salient at the time of performance.217  
A single university possesses limited power to impact the first two variables. 
Even heroic efforts would likely prove insufficient to undo pervasive societal 
stereotypes.218 That said, through targeted communications campaigns and careful 
attention to demographic representation across university faculty and leadership, 
universities may be able to impact the salience of certain negative stereotypes.219 
Similarly, a university possesses a limited ability to alter the perception that 
measures of academic merit (for example, final exams or standardized tests) are 
diagnostic of intellectual ability.220  
Universities retain comparably more control over the third factor. As revealed 
by the social science and the student anecdotes, severe underrepresentation is one 
factor that renders racial identity salient.221 Universities can translate this insight into 
affirmative efforts designed to avoid such scenarios. Such efforts would naturally 
extend to admissions—a site of institutional governance that directly impacts student 
body diversity. Understood in this way, race-conscious admissions emerge as an 
essential component of a broader institutional project to ensure that all students, 
regardless of race, can reach their academic potential and enjoy the full benefits of 
university membership.222 
The social science, in turn, reinforces the students’ testimony and 
administrators’ observations that racial diversity is needed, in part, to ensure that the 
university provides a “reasonable environment for those students admitted.”223 In 
the next and final Part, I discuss the broader doctrinal and normative appeal of a 
diversity rationale that centers the goal of equal university membership. 
 
                                                     
215 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
218 See generally Kang, supra note 147 (reviewing likely sources of implicit 
stereotypes).  
219 See Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 148, at 649–54 (observing a decrease of implicit 
bias against women in a cohort of female students after one year in a single-sex university). 
220 Growing evidence suggests that educational institutions can reduce identity-
contingent threats by employing pedagogical approaches that promote a “growth mindset” 
and utilize “wise feedback” when evaluating student performance. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et 
al., The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing Critical Feedback Across the Racial Divide, PERS. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1302, 1308 (2012); David S. Yeager et al., Breaking the Cycle of 
Mistrust: Wise Interventions to Provide Critical Feedback Across the Racial Divide, 143 J. 
EXP. PSYCHOL. 804, 806–07, 811 (2013).  
221 See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.  
222 See Bowen, supra note 152, at 343–45 (suggesting the need to complement racial 
diversity with color-conscious ideologies, both in admissions and in the classroom).  
223 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).  
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III.  DOCTRINAL PAY-OFF AND POLITICAL PURCHASE 
 
In the preceding two Parts, I have invited a reframing of the diversity rationale 
that centers the relationship between racial diversity and personal equality within 
the university. I have argued that standard accounts continue to understate the case 
for diversity by obscuring its most compelling feature: its ability to mitigate the 
personal equality harms that students of color face when severely underrepresented 
on college campuses.224 This final Part explores the broader appeal of this reframing. 
To begin, this approach offers a new constitutional anchor for diversity. Even if not 
immediately apparent, the harms associated with under-representation resemble, in 
meaningful ways, those derivative of de jure segregation.225 This insight, in turn, 
helps to disrupt common critiques of race-conscious admissions by revealing how 
such policies are vital to promote individual equality in the here and now. 
 
A.  A New Constitutional Anchor 
 
As I have noted throughout, my basic claim is that the Supreme Court continues 
to undersell the constitutional case for racial diversity. This has occurred, in part, 
because those Justices who have embraced the diversity rationale have failed to 
effectively locate diversity and its benefits within the Supreme Court’s broader 
equality jurisprudence. Specifically, multiple pre-Brown desegregation cases offer a 
natural, yet untapped, constitutional anchor for contemporary conversations about 
diversity and race-conscious admissions. These cases arose in a different era marked 
by widespread de jure segregation. Nonetheless, they illuminate the constitutional 
infirmity of institutional conditions that deny certain students, because of their race, 
the full benefits of university membership. Thus, when tethered to a vision of 
diversity that centers the goal of equal university membership, this precedent offers 
a natural constitutional hook for diversity today.226 
                                                     
224 See supra Parts I, II.  
225 See infra Section III.A 
226 Before the Supreme Court overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), its desegregation jurisprudence began to 
interrogate and unpack the constitutional harms inherent to de jure segregation, often in the 
domain of education. See infra Section III.A.1–2. See also Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 
305 U.S. 337, 349–50 (1938):  
 
The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal training, or of the 
quality of the training which it does supply, but of its duty when it provides such 
training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of 
right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for 
white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white 
resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident having the 
same qualifications is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it. 
That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege 
which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in 
another State does not remove the discrimination. 
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1.  McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
 
Perhaps the most relevant precedent comes from McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education,227 a 1950 decision involving de jure segregation at 
the University of Oklahoma.228 George M. McLaurin, the plaintiff, was an African 
American man who had been barred from the University of Oklahoma Graduate 
School because of his race.229 Following multiple lower court victories, McLaurin 
gained admission to the Graduate School.230 Yet even after matriculating, McLaurin 
remained subject to multiple race-based restrictions that triggered his ultimate 
appeal to the Supreme Court.231 Chief Justice Vinson, who authored the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous opinion, described McLaurin’s plight as follows:  
 
[McLaurin was] assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for 
colored students; . . . assigned to a table in the library on the main floor; 
and . . . permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as other students, 
although here again he is assigned to a special table.232 
 
To defend its policy, Oklahoma argued that the restrictions were “in form merely 
nominal,” and therefore did not violate McLaurin’s Equal Protection rights.233 The 
Supreme Court agreed that, in certain respects, the restrictions were limited: 
 
[McLaurin is permitted to use] the same classroom, library and cafeteria 
as students of other races; there is no indication that the seats to which he 
is assigned in these rooms have any disadvantage of location . . . [and h]e 
may wait in line in the cafeteria and there stand and talk with fellow 
students, but while he eats he must remain apart.234 
 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court determined that “the conditions under which 
[McLaurin] is required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and 
present right to the equal protection of the laws.”235 According to the Supreme Court, 
                                                     
 
227 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
228 Id. at 638–39.  
229 Id. at 638. 
230 Mclaurin, 339 U.S. at 638–40. Mclaurin was admitted only after substantial 
litigation compelled Oklahoma to alter policies that had “made it a misdemeanor to maintain 
or operate, teach or attend a school at which both whites and negroes are enrolled or taught.” 
Id. 
231 Id. at 640. 
232 Id. at 640. The restrictions evolved over the course of the litigation. See id. 
233 Id.  
234 Id. at 640–41. 
235 Id. at 642. 
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the restrictions practically and symbolically “handicapped” McLaurin, thereby 
rendering his education “unequal to that of his classmates.”236 
Practically, the restrictions “impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to 
learn his profession.”237 Symbolically, the restrictions “signif[ied] that the State, in 
administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, set[] 
McLaurin apart from the other students.”238 As characterized by the Supreme Court, 
the policy marked McLaurin as an institutional outsider, a result that itself carried 
constitutional implications. The Supreme Court accordingly concluded that the 
Constitution could not condone conditions traceable to the state that “depriv[ed 
McLaurin] of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own 
merits.”239 
In striking down the policy, the Supreme Court expressly linked the conditions’ 
constitutional infirmity to their impact on McLaurin’s opportunity to receive an 
education equal to that of his white peers.240 Part of this asymmetry implicated what 
could be understood as learning and networking benefits—benefits denied to 
McLaurin but available to his white classmates.241 This concern with unequal 
education is understandable, as it tracks the Court’s then-growing unease with the 
proposition that “separate-but-equal” facilities could safeguard the constitutional 
guarantee of equal educational opportunity.  
                                                     
236 Id. at 641. This conclusion is anchored, in part, to the conclusion that segregation 
deprived McLaurin of benefits that resembled the discourse benefits that formed the basis of 
Justice Powell’s diversity defense in Bakke. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). In this sense, McLaurin recognized that admission was insufficient to secure the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of educational equality. Even within the university, 
equal protection concerns arise when institutional conditions uniquely burden certain 
students on account of race. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.  
237 McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 641–42. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. The Supreme Court also cautioned that the restrictions would undermine broader 
societal interests. McLaurin was attending Oklahoma’s flagship graduate program in 
education. By impairing his training (that is, his ability to learn), the restrictions 
compromised his ability to attain those skills essential to teaching. This impairment, by 
extension, would exact downstream costs on his future students—recipients of an instructor 
who had been denied an equal education. See id. at 641.  
 
Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders 
increases correspondingly. . . . Those who will come under his guidance and 
influence must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own 
education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is 
unequal to that of his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which produce such 
inequalities cannot be sustained. 
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Translated to the contemporary context, the Court’s concern about unequal 
conditions within the Graduate School reinforces the normative appeal of a diversity 
rationale that centers the equal university membership interests of students of color. 
It is true, of course, that McLaurin offers an imperfect analogy to the present context. 
Policies that segregate students on the basis of race are unlikely to arise in 2019. But 
even recognizing this distinction, McLaurin offers valuable texture to ongoing 
debates about diversity and the merits of affirmative action. Chief Justice Vinson 
reminds us that basic equality concerns arise when institutional conditions deprive 
certain students, because of their race, the full benefits of university membership.242 
The lack of racial diversity can be understood as one such institutional 
condition: when severely underrepresented, students of color are likely to confront 
racially contingent headwinds that their peers never have to face. Understood in this 
sense, student body racial diversity can be celebrated as one dimension of an 
institutional project designed to mitigate harms that resemble, in meaningful ways, 
those caused by Oklahoma’s formal policy.243 Race-conscious admissions, in turn, 
emerge as a vital tool to prevent such harms and safeguard every student’s interest 
in equal university membership. This framing ultimately invites the following 
question: To the extent diversity prevents harms that parallel those caused by de jure 
segregation, how could the pursuit of diversity not constitute a compelling interest 
for purposes of strict scrutiny?244 
 
2.  Sweatt v. Painter 
 
On the same day the Supreme Court decided McLaurin, it also ruled on Sweatt 
v. Painter,245 which involved a Texas law that barred African Americans from the 
University of Texas Law School (“UT Law”), the state’s flagship law school.246 
Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, a state trial court had held that Texas’s 
educational scheme, which offered legal training to whites only, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.247 The state court continued the case so that Texas could “supply 
                                                     
242 Id. at 641–42. 
243 McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638 (describing Oklahoma’s law which had “made it a 
misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a school at which both whites and 
Negroes are enrolled or taught.”). The Supreme Court has interpreted Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637, to have recognized “the link between equality 
of opportunity to obtain an education and equality of employment opportunity.” Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 n.16 (1976).  
244 At the same time, Parents Involved offers a useful reminder that the Supreme Court 
will not necessarily uphold a race-conscious policy simply because it mitigates harms—such 
as racial segregation—that led the Supreme Court to strike down explicitly discriminatory 
policies in McLaurin, Sweatt, and Brown. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007). 
245 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
246 For background facts, see Otis H. King, The Legal Sin: The Creation of Texas 
Southern University, A Place That Never Should Have Been, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 13, 
15–18 (2012). 
247 Id. at 631–32. 
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substantially equal facilities” to African Americans.248 The State responded by 
opening an alternate “downtown law school” that African Americans could 
attend.249 This alternate school, to which Sweatt was ultimately admitted, became 
the focus of his appeal to the Supreme Court.250 
Mirroring McLaurin, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Texas law 
violated Heman Sweatt’s equal protection rights.251 Moreover, as in McLaurin, the 
Supreme Court’s driving concerns about educational equality translate to today’s 
affirmative action debates. To appreciate the connection, one need only look to the 
Court’s reasoning. In finding for Sweatt, the Supreme Court identified three material 
areas of inequity between the “downtown law school” and UT Law: (1) tangible 
resources; (2) intangible qualities; and (3) access to professional networks.  
First, the Supreme Court observed that UT Law was “superior” “[i]n terms of 
number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of 
the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar 
activities.”252 
Second, and more troubling to the Supreme Court, were UT Law’s superior 
intangible qualities, which Chief Justice Vinson described as “incapable of objective 
measure but which make for greatness in a law school.”253 These qualities included, 
for example, “reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position 
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”254 
Lastly, by excluding Sweatt from UT Law, Texas effectively denied Sweatt 
access to the individual human beings with whom he would inevitably interact as a 
lawyer.255 As a student at the “downtown law school,” Sweatt would have been 
relegated to an institution that “excludes from its student body members of the racial 
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and include most of the 
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will 
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.”256 This lack of 
                                                     
248 Id. at 632. 
249 Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 575 (2000) (noting that non-
white students could attend the “downtown law school . . . .”).  
250 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632. 
251 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636. 
252 Id. at 633–34. UT Law boasted a staff of sixteen full-time and three part-time 
professors; had 850 students; maintained a library or over 65,000 volumes; and included a 
law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. Id. at 
632–33. The “downtown law school,” in contrast, had five full-time faculty; 23 students; a 
library with 16,500 volumes; and a practice moot court and legal aid association. Id. at 633.  
253 Id. at 634. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 635–36. The networking disparity is difficult to overstate. Whereas the 
“downtown law school” had one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar, UT Law alumnae 
“occup[ied] the most distinguished positions in the private practices of the law and in the 
public life of the State.” Id. at 633.  
256 Id. at 634. 
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access precluded the Supreme Court from concluding that the alternative law school 
satisfied Sweatt’s right to an equal education under the Constitution.257    
This catalogue of disparities highlights the layered harms derived from Texas’s 
segregative scheme. The Supreme Court’s analysis also highlighted inequities that 
could be understood in terms of learning, networking, and signaling. In other words, 
the Supreme Court conceived the constitutional question in terms that made 
doctrinally relevant—and perhaps dispositive—conditions that compromised 
Sweatt’s ability to realize an equal university membership. As a remedy, the Court 
ordered UT Law to admit Sweatt so that he could “claim his full constitutional right: 
legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races.”258 
As with McLaurin, Sweatt comprises an imperfect analogy when translated to 
the contemporary context. Nonetheless, when read in concert, these decisions offer 
an historical lens through which one can better appreciate the equal protection 
implications of institutional conditions that undermine equal university membership. 
In so doing, it fortifies the constitutional anchor for a diversity rationale predicated 
on the personal equality interests of actual university students.  
 
B.  More Diversity Benefits 
 
To fully appreciate the doctrinal and normative appeal of a diversity rationale 
that centers equal university membership, it is helpful to return to Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke.259 In striking down the Medical School’s admissions policy, 
Justice Powell mobilized a critique of affirmative action that has become standard 
across caselaw and public discourse.260 At its core, this critique assumes that 
whatever the benefit, race-conscious admissions confer racial “preferences” and 
violate the equal protection rights of “innocent third parties.”261 This premise 
continues to inform the Supreme Court’s hostility to affirmative action and underlies 
the Supreme Court’s erection and maintenance of an equal protection doctrine that 
subjects all racial classifications—whether invidious or benign—to strict scrutiny.262 
                                                     
257 Id. at 634–35. 
258 Id. at 635. 
259 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
260 Id. at 307–10, 319–20. Evidence that this has become standard across caselaw and 
public discourse is shown by the fact that this opinion has been cited over 1,000 times (on 
LexisNexis). Further, several articles discuss and reiterate the opinion. See, e.g., Saverio 
Cereste, Minority Inclusion Without Race-Based Affirmative Action: An Embodiment of 
Justice Powell’s Vision, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205 (2002); Emanuel Margolis, 
Latching on to Affirmative Action, 77 CONN. B.J. 1 (2003). 
261 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003). Scholars have persuasively 
challenged the “innocent third parties” frame. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of 
Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91–97 (1986).  
262 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Absent searching 
judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of 
determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in 
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”).  
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Scholars have critiqued the view that racial classifications necessarily exact 
equality harms and confer corresponding racial preferences.263 Many of these 
critiques are compelling and deserve greater attention in scholarly and public 
discourse.264 Nonetheless, for the limited purposes of this Article, I accept the 
proposition that race-conscious admissions do, in fact, inflict equality harms on 
applicants from “disfavored groups.” I do this not to concede such claims,265 but 
rather to illustrate that even if one begins from this contestable point of departure, 
student body diversity—as a mechanism to promote personal equality within the 
university—remains constitutionally compelling. 
The standard diversity rationale, which Justice Powell mobilized in Bakke, 
effectively reduces the constitutional inquiry to a cost-benefit analysis. On one side 
of the scale are equality harms ostensibly suffered by white applicants; on the other 
side are educational benefits—that is, discourse benefits—that the university attains 
from a diverse student body. Albeit reductionist and stylized, one could depict this 
cost-benefit analysis as follows:  
 
the cost:   equality harms suffered by whites 
v. 
the benefit:  diversity benefits to the university 
 
As noted above, the premise that race-conscious admissions confer undeserved 
“preferences” on students of color and subject white applicants to cognizable injury 
rests on contestable normative and empirical assumptions.266 Yet even if one accepts 
this premise, the foregoing balancing test misrepresents the full breath of personal 
                                                     
263 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose 
Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 
174, 176 (2016); Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of 
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 24 (1994) (“Moreover, many of the criteria that are 
unquestioningly taken to be important impartial indicators of people’s competencies, merit, 
and potential, such as test scores, not only fail to be precise measurements of these qualities, 
but systematically stigmatize these individuals within institutions in which these tests 
function as important criteria of admission.”). 
264 For multiple reasons, including some noted by Justice Powell, racial 
classifications—or otherwise attending to an applicant’s race—may be necessary to 
ameliorate racial inequality steeped in the status quo. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43. 
265 I have contested such claims elsewhere. See, e.g., Feingold, Racing Towards Color-
blindness, supra note 47 (arguing that race-consciousness is often necessary to move closer 
to ideals such as racial neutrality and “meritocracy”).  
266 See supra note 263 and accompanying text; see also See Kimberly West-Faulcon, 
Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 590 (2017) 
(discussing the fallacy that affirmative action confers a “Black bonus” and commensurate 
“Asian penalty”); Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of 
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2002) (describing the “the common 
yet mistaken notion that when white applicants . . . fail to gain admission ahead of minority 
applicants with equal or lesser qualifications, the likely cause is affirmative action”). 
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equality interests implicated by university admissions. Specifically, it omits the 
equal university membership harms that students of color suffer absent a racially 
diverse student body. When this third variable enters the equation, the cost-benefit 
analysis reappears as follows:  
 
the cost:   equality harms suffered by whites 
v. 
the benefit:  diversity benefits to the university 
and 
   equal university membership for all 
 
One could argue that the foregoing depiction is not wholly foreign to the 
caselaw. The Supreme Court has, at times, marked the relationship between diversity 
and personal equality.267 Nonetheless, as discussed in Part I, these moments have not 
translated into a constitutional doctrine that locates diversity’s value in its ability to 
mitigate the race-based harms that students of color suffer absent racial diversity.268 
Even when present, equal university membership concerns have remained under-
theorized and under-privileged within the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis. 
Reflecting this omission, legal and lay discourse continue to default to a framework 
that fails to capture the full stakes of university admissions and the constitutional 
implications thereof. As a result, we continue to situate conversations about diversity 
within a cost-benefit analysis that obscures one of diversity’s most compelling 
functions. 
This function is, of course, diversity’s ability to promote personal equality 
within the university. When this function is elevated within the analysis, it becomes 
more difficult to deny that, at a minimum, race-conscious admissions involve 
dueling personal equality harms. Some might contend that even accepting this 
descriptive account, the equality harms that befall “disfavored” applicants should 
always prevail over those that befall admitted (but underrepresented) students of 
color. I take up such arguments more directly in the final section. For now, my goal 
is to mark that standard accounts of diversity are, at best, incomplete, as they elide 
a key equality harm implicated by university admissions. As a result, standard 
diversity debates fail to engage a critical benefit of race-conscious admissions. 
In this sense, a framework that makes salient the relationship between student 
body diversity and equal university membership reveals more benefits of diversity. 
But this is not just a matter of quantity; it is also a matter of quality—in the sense of 
revealing better benefits of diversity. For one, an equal university membership frame 
reunites the diversity rationale with the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
commitments to equality. This occurs, in part, by situating the diversity rationale 
within historical commitments to remove barriers that hindered students of color 
from realizing equal educational opportunities. But the qualitative benefits run 
deeper. As I discuss in the next and final section, this re-framing offers a path to 
                                                     
267 See supra Part I. 
268 Id. 
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soften hostility to affirmative action more broadly. Specifically, by centering 
diversity’s function as a driver of personal equality in the present, universities can 
champion race-conscious admissions as a tool to safeguard basic normative 
commitments that underlie the Supreme Court’s contemporary equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
 
C.  Better Diversity Benefits 
 
Given pending litigation and a shifting Supreme Court, the future of race-
conscious admissions remains tenuous.269 The appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, 
who constitutes a fifth Justice openly hostile to affirmative action, may render the 
most compelling case for diversity insufficient to withstand a future challenge.270 
Nonetheless, rediscovering diversity as a mechanism to promote personal equality 
should soften lingering anxiety about the diversity rationale’s normative foundation 
and strengthen its doctrinal purchase. This is possible, in part, because concerns 
about equal university membership track the values and principles that have 
informed the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—including concerns 
articulated by the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices—since Bakke. 
 
1.  The “Right to Compete” 
 
Over four decades of equal protection doctrine have embraced a vision of 
constitutional equality that privileges individual rights over group rights271 and equal 
opportunity over equal outcome.272 This vision has translated into the constitutional 
mandate that the state allocate public goods—such as employment or admission—
                                                     
269 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
270 See id. 
271 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Peña,, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“protect[s] persons, not groups”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made 
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor 
race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual . . . .”); see also 
Primus, supra note 75, at 560–61 (“[T]he rhetoric and the doctrine of Grutter—and of 
Gratz—are committed to individualism as the dominant understanding of equal 
protection.”). 
272 By divorcing the Equal Protection Clause from group-based outcomes, the Supreme 
Court is able to frame outcome-oriented policies as contrary to the ethos of constitutional 
equality. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 
(2007). (“Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the 
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated 
recognition that at the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple 
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components 
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and 
brackets omitted)). 
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on the basis of individual “merit,” irrespective of a person’s race.273 According to 
the Supreme Court, when race intrudes upon otherwise “neutral” decision making 
processes, it deprives the individual of her constitutional right to an equal 
opportunity to compete.274 
This vision of equality, which I refer to in related scholarship as the “right to 
compete,”275 can be seen in Justice Powell’s treatment of race-conscious admissions 
in Bakke. In response to his liberal colleagues, Powell remarked that the “denial to 
respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is 
the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program.”276 He further stated 
that “[o]ne should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception 
of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on 
the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.”277 Both statements reflect a vision of 
constitutional equality that privileges the right of individuals to compete for public 
benefits on the basis of their talent and potential, irrespective of race. Justice Powell 
understood the Medical School’s admissions policy to infringe upon this right.278  
As noted above, Justice Powell’s view of affirmative action and its 
corresponding harms has long informed the Supreme Court’s skepticism of race-
conscious admissions, which are seen as “racial preferences” that deprive “innocent” 
whites of their constitutional right to compete.279 Scholars have lodged compelling 
                                                     
273 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (condemning the 
Medical School for its “disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); see also Erman & Walton, supra note 151, at 352, 359 (“Merit stalks equal 
protection jurisprudence. It is a shadow interest, treated as compelling but as yet 
undeclared. . . . The Court is often protective of standardized tests and grades, which it views 
as generally open, competitive, and relatively accurate predictors of subsequent 
performance.”). 
274 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is 
paramount.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“The 
Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of 
public contracts based solely upon their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong, 
their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid 
rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking [sic].”). 
275 For a more comprehensive analysis of this “right to compete,” see generally 
Feingold, Equal Protection, supra note 130 (discussing the evolution and entrenchment of a 
“right to compete” within contemporary equal protection doctrine). 
276 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 & n.52.  
277 Id. at 294 n.34. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 307 (“We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as 
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the 
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations.”); see generally John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An 
Analysis of the Rhetoric against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994) (reviewing 
common arguments against affirmative action).  
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critiques that challenge these portrayals.280 My aim here, however, is different. 
Rather than contest prevailing frames, my claim is that diversity should be 
compelling to Justices across the political spectrum, in part, because it promotes the 
values that permeated Justice Powell’s Bakke decision and continue to inform 
prevailing equal protection doctrine. 
To begin, the concept of equal university membership captures an equality 
interest that attaches to each individual university student. This is not a story about 
remedying amorphous societal discrimination, accounting for histories of unequal 
treatment, or ensuring equal group-based outcomes. Notwithstanding their arguable 
appeal, the Supreme Court has rejected these goals as sufficient to constitute a 
compelling interest.281 A diversity rationale designed to foster equality within the 
university is different. By focusing on a personal and present equality interest, it 
aligns with judicial pronouncements that privilege individualistic visions of equality 
and presentist conceptions of discrimination.282 
Moreover, when institutional environments subject certain students to race-
dependent headwinds, these conditions compromise related commitments to racial 
neutrality and individual meritocracy.283 Absent diversity, innocent students from 
negatively stereotyped groups, for no fault of their own, suffer race-based harms that 
undermine their ability to enjoy fundamental aspects of university membership—
spanning learning, networking, and signaling.284 The students’ unburdened peers, in 
turn, reap unearned benefits that are tied to their race.285 
When translated to the Supreme Court’s equal protection parlance, these race-
based burdens can be understood as institutional conditions that undermine certain 
students’ right to compete within the university.286 For those committed to this vision 
of constitutional equality, environments that impose race-specific harms should be 
troubling. This deviation from normative commitments to racial neutrality and 
                                                     
280 See generally Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as 
Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of Preferential Treatment, 16 NAT’L BLACK 
L.J. 127 (1998) (interrogating the contention that affirmative action deviates from 
commitments to neutrality and meritocracy); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012) (offering a rebuke of the colorblind constitutionalism that 
informs the prevailing vision of constitutional equality). 
281 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09. 
282 See supra notes 268–272. 
283 See Erman & Walton, supra note 151, at 350–61. 
284 See supra Part II.B. 
285 See supra Part II.B. 
286 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 505–06 (“The 
dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal 
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on 
inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”); see also Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 
150 F.3d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1998) (“These cases all stand for the proposition that when 
a plaintiff is denied the opportunity to compete on an equal basis because of that plaintiff’s 
race or gender, the denial of the opportunity to compete on equal footing constitutes an injury 
in fact for standing purposes.”). 
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individual meritocracy should invite remediation. It accordingly appears a modest 
step to suggest that the government has a compelling interest to structure educational 
environments that mitigate such harms. Race-conscious admissions are no panacea. 
But as the anecdotes and social science in Part II reflect, such policies offer a vital 
piece of broader efforts to safeguard each student’s right to compete within the 
university, irrespective of her race. 
 
2.  Racial Stigma and Social Cohesion 
 
An equal university membership frame also has the potential to disrupt lay 
theories about racial stigma and social cohesion that continue to inform the Supreme 
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.287 Since Bakke, multiple Justices have 
critiqued race-conscious admissions on the grounds that such policies stigmatize 
their intended beneficiaries and trigger racial resentment in others.288 The Supreme 
Court has suggested, for instance, that “[u]nless [race-conscious practices] are 
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”289   
                                                     
287 See Siegel, supra note 60, at 1295. For a broader discussion of stigma within the 
Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence, see Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. 
L. REV. 245, 248–49 (1983); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 349–355 (1987); R.A. Lenhardt, 
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 
(2004) (“If one has been stigmatized, he or she exists outside the polity, on the margins, in 
some way. This is what it means to be stigmatized. That is to say, racial stigma deprives 
stigmatized individuals of the acceptance and the other tools they need to participate as 
whole, functioning members of society.”); see also Feingold, Equal Protection, supra note 
130, at 3–7 (detailing the lay theories about stigma and racial resentment that have traveled 
through the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence). 
288 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm[,]” because “[u]nless they 
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (“All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and 
benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals 
burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those 
so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious.”). 
289 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (“Classifications based on race carry a 
danger of stigmatic harm.”); see also Parents Involved in Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007) (Kennedy, J, concurring) (contesting the dissent’s claim that 
the “racial classifications used here cause no hurt or anger of the type the Constitution 
prevents.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This problem of stigma does 
not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ 
of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, 
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in 
their advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination 
did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did 
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Although pervasive, the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, grounded these 
concerns to empirical evidence that links racial classifications to these perceived 
harms. To the contrary, they appear to rest on judicial “instincts” and lay theories 
about human behavior.290 Scholars have begun to interrogate the empirical validity 
of such claims.291 As referenced in Part II, existing social science suggests that the 
Supreme Court may have the wrong target: for students within the university, the 
more likely driver of racial stigma—and to some degree racial resentment—is the 
absence of racial diversity, not the use of a race-conscious admissions plan.292  
The law students’ testimony, discussed in Part II above, reinforces this point.293 
Recall that their experience occurred in a post-affirmative action—that is, 
“colorblind”—California.294 Nonetheless, their severe under-representation 
facilitated a heightened sense of stigma and racial identity salience. Accordingly, to 
the extent the Supreme Court is concerned about racial stigma (felt by students of 
                                                     
not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed 
without discrimination.”). 
290 For purposes of this Article, my primary interest is to mark that multiple Justices 
have staked out the position that equal protection jurisprudence should attend to these 
normative concerns. Often, the Court will simply state something akin to the view that racial 
classifications “threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial 
group and to incite racial hostility.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); see also United 
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173–74 (1977) (“Furthermore, 
even preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended 
to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such policy may imply to some the recipients 
inferiority and especial need for protection.”). I do not mean to suggest that Justices should 
always avoid judgments rooted in personal intuition or experience. My narrower claim is that 
such judgments should be made transparently, and that all empirical claims—whether they 
support or contradict a Justice’s viewpoint—should be held to the same standard of proof. 
Yet as the case law bears out, this often is not the case. See generally Feingold & Carter, 
supra note 125 (exploring the Supreme Court’s inconsistent relationship with empirical 
evidence of discrimination). 
291 See Bowen, supra note 147, at 1199. 
292 See id.; supra Section II.B.2. Race-conscious admissions might also be necessary to 
mitigate dignitary harms that arise under colorblind admissions regimes. See Boddie, supra 
note 32, at 78 (describing the stigmatic harm colorblind policies exact on individuals who 
identify by race). Additionally, expressly pursuing diversity as a means to promote equality 
within the institution is likely to reduce the potential for diversity initiatives themselves to 
produce stigmatic harms by, for example, marking students of color as perpetual institutional 
outsiders. See, e.g., Thierry Devos & Mazharin Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERS. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 463–64 (2005); Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
2151, 2155 (2013) (“But problems with racial capitalism arise when white individuals and 
predominantly white institutions seek and achieve racial diversity without examining their 
motives and practices. . . . This superficial view of diversity consequently leads white 
individuals and predominantly white institutions to treat nonwhiteness as a prized 
commodity rather than as a cherished and personal manifestation of identity.”). 
293 See supra Section II.B.1. 
294 Id. 
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color) and social cohesion, race-conscious admissions may function more as the 
cure, not a cause. 
 
3.  A Broader Appeal 
 
In addition to the foregoing, reframing diversity as a driver of personal equality 
responds to anxieties that racial diversity is pedagogically relevant only in limited 
subject matters or disciplines.295 Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, need not worry 
that racial diversity’s benefits are confined to classes where “the subject matter is 
racially or ethnically salient.”296 To the contrary, because equal university 
membership transcends any single dimension of university life, racial diversity 
matters whether the forum is a nineteenth-century British history class, an 
introductory physics class,297 or an orientation workshop on student organizations 
and government. 
For purposes of minimizing harms associated with severe under-representation, 
racial diversity may be more important in certain contexts than others. As a buffer 
to stereotype threat and social identity threat, racial diversity will likely prove more 
critical in disciplines and domains in which negative stereotypes hold a stronger 
historical significance and contemporary salience.298 Nonetheless, when diversity’s 
function is tethered to each student’s personal equality interests, diversity’s value 
travels across subject matters; regardless of the setting, student body diversity 
“would create an environment in which all students can perform to their capacity 
through the reduction of stereotypes, racial anxiety, and racial isolation.”299 
Lastly, valuing the link between racial diversity and equality does not come at 
the expense of other diversity benefits.300 To the contrary, as referenced throughout, 
                                                     
295 See Lawrence III, supra note 17, at 774 (“[W]hen the First Amendment justification 
for diversity—academic conversation—is separated from the substantive content of that 
conversation—learning about the social reality of racism—it is not apparent why race should 
be a factor in deciding who should participate in that conversation. ‘What does the color of 
an individual’s skin matter in a discussion of quantum physics?’ is the paradigm rhetorical 
question posed by affirmative action’s opponents.”). 
296 Godsil, supra note 13, at 42 (revisiting a line of questioning from oral argument in 
Fisher I when Chief Justice Roberts asked, among other things, “What—what unique—what 
unique perspective does a minority student bring to a physics class?”). 
297 An open letter to the Supreme Court from the Equity & Inclusion in Physics & 
Astronomy group captures this perspective. See AN OPEN LETTER TO SCOTUS FROM 
PROFESSIONAL PHYSICISTS (Dec. 14, 2015), http://eblur.github.io/scotus. 
[https://perma.cc/6T2R-MGPJ]. 
298 See supra Section II.B.2. 
299 Godsil, supra note 13, at 62–63. 
300 At times, constitutional analysis requires the Supreme Court to balance competing 
interests. Antidiscrimination law, for instance, can be understood as a schema designed to 
ensure equality (for some) at the expense of individual liberty (of others). See Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 595, 595–96 (2001) (“The tension between freedom of association and 
antidiscrimination laws is inherently difficult. Freedom of association is unquestionably a 
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equal university membership will often function as a condition precedent for other 
diversity benefits that already feature within the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. Justice Powell’s exposition of “discourse benefits” offers an 
illustrative example. To attain a robust marketplace of ideas, a university must admit 
individuals with different experiences and viewpoints. But it must also foster an 
educational environment in which all voices will speak and be heard. As the social 
science and law student anecdotes reveal, the burdens associated with racial 
tokenism can compromise social and academic engagement and chill classroom 
participation. When this occurs, the individual student’s experience suffers, but so 
does that of her peers. Racial diversity can warm that chill, and in so doing, nurture 
an educational environment that safeguards the equality interests of all while 
facilitating a classroom climate that is “livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting.”301 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Fisher II reaffirmed that public universities may, consistent with the 
Constitution, employ narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions policies designed 
to promote student body diversity.302 Nonetheless, Fisher II did little to secure the 
diversity rationale’s doctrinal future.303 Legal challenges persist, the Supreme Court 
has shifted to the right, and renewed debates about race-conscious admissions reveal 
public uncertainty concerning the merits of diversity. The future of affirmative 
action in higher education arguably hangs in the balance. 
For those interested in fortifying the diversity rationale, one piece of this project 
requires uplifting the link between racial diversity and the present and personal 
equality interests of actual university students. Even as it has traveled across 
caselaw, this relationship remains absent from the core assumptions that structure 
ongoing debates about diversity and its constitutional foundation. As a result, the 
diversity rationale remains disconnected from its most compelling quality and 
susceptible to otherwise avoidable legal and political critique. By elevating a vision 
of diversity predicated on personal equality within the university, diversity’s 
defenders can disrupt these critiques and, in so doing, buttress the constitutional case 
for race-conscious admissions in higher education and, potentially, beyond. 
                                                     
fundamental right, and one of its core aspects is the right of a group to choose who is in and 
who is out. However, antidiscrimination laws seek to keep people from being excluded based 
on invidious characteristics such as race, gender, religion, disability, and sexual 
orientation.”). 
301 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). This example reflects the insight that 
First Amendment principles are intertwined with basic equality commitments; see also supra 
note 42. 
302 See generally Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).  
303 Id.  
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